

# SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE RISK MANAGEMENT TOOLKIT



United Nations Peace Operations

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<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

CBCM	community-based complaint mechanism
CDT	conduct and discipline team
CDU	Conduct and Discipline Unit
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ERM	Enterprise Risk Management
IRT	Immediate Response Team
NGO	non-governmental organisation
Missions	UN Field Missions
MINUSCA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MONUSCO	UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
PCC	police-contributing country
PESTLE	Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal and Environmental
SEA	sexual exploitation and abuse
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
TAM	technical assessment mission
TCC	troop-contributing country
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNDSS	UN Department for Safety and Security



## Foreword

*The Secretary-General has been clear that acts of sexual exploitation and abuse undermine the values of the United Nations and the principle that we must do no harm to those we are entrusted with protecting. Effective prevention activities constitute the foundation for ensuring that all United Nations personnel deployed in peace operations maintain the highest standards of conduct and integrity. The DPKO/DFS Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Risk Management Toolkit is a critical mechanism in support of our collective resolve to be pro-active and comprehensive in addressing sexual exploitation and abuse in peace operations.*

*Risk management enables peace operations to avoid or reduce threats in all areas. As sexual exploitation and abuse constitutes a particularly virulent threat to our ability to effectively carry out our mandates, this is an area in which a dedicated tool is needed. Risk management should constitute a continuous cycle of identifying risk, assessing its nature and implementing mitigating measures in order to maintain a permanent preventive posture. Effective risk management is integrated into mission planning and serves to provide mission leadership with data and targeted information to inform decision-making.*

*The DPKO/DFS Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Risk Management Toolkit is designed to be adaptable to the specific prevailing conditions in different types of peace operations. We believe that the end users of the Toolkit will appreciate the strategic guidance it provides, in the form of a conceptual framework as well as practical guidance and activities through sample work plans, assessments, tracking and other management tools.*

*We recognize the challenges of addressing sexual exploitation and abuse in the unique environments of peace operations and we are confident that the DPKO/DFS Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Risk Management Toolkit will be a useful, hands-on instrument for practitioners, and a key management and accountability tool for mission leadership.*



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# PART I: SEA RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS



# Introduction

## Why focus on risk management?

All UN Field Missions<sup>1</sup> (hereafter “Missions”) have a programme of work in place to prevent UN personnel from committing sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of the population and to take swift action when it occurs. Risk management helps Missions address SEA more effectively in three key ways.

Firstly, risk management enables Missions to be proactive in addressing SEA. By anticipating future threats, the Mission is better able to take actions now to reduce those threats and even avoid them altogether. Secondly, risk management supports better decision-making on SEA. For instance, by providing a good understanding of risks and why they happen, Mission leadership are better able to decide how to prevent SEA. Similarly, by identifying which risks are a priority, Mission leadership can take more informed decisions about where to focus its attention and the Mission’s resources. And thirdly, risk management provides a concrete way to hold Mission leadership, managers and commanders accountable on SEA by clearly identifying who is responsible for addressing specific risks and what actions they must take.

Risk management is not, however, only about managing threats. It is also a way to harness future opportunities to improve the way the Mission tackles SEA. For example, it can help identify new ways for the Mission to work in partnership with Member States to promote the UN values of honour, pride and integrity among uniformed personnel serving in Missions. Risk management also offers opportunities to engage with civil society to prevent SEA and help victims<sup>2</sup> and children born as a result of SEA by UN personnel.

## What does the Toolkit do?

This Toolkit provides UN Field Missions with a systematic approach to managing risks relating to sexual exploitation and abuse of the population by UN personnel. The approach combines standardized scales with professional judgement, and leaves significant room for users to adapt the approach to their unique context.

The Toolkit will help Mission leadership answer the following questions:

1. What is the likelihood that UN personnel commit SEA in this Mission environment? What impact would this have on the Mission’s objectives? Which factors drive this risk?

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<sup>1</sup> In this toolkit, the term “UN Field Missions” refers to UN peacekeeping operations and UN special political missions.

<sup>2</sup> In this toolkit, the term “victim” refers to “a person who is, or has been, sexually exploited or abused”.

Source: United Nations Glossary on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, 5 October 2016.

2. How effective are internal controls in the Mission in preventing UN personnel from committing SEA? What additional measures can the Mission take to further reduce the risk of UN personnel committing SEA?
3. Are risks to the Mission's ability to have allegations of SEA investigated being identified, assessed and managed effectively?
4. Are risks to the Mission's ability to assist victims of SEA and children born as a result of SEA by UN personnel, being identified, assessed and managed effectively?
5. Are risks changing or remaining constant? Is it time to conduct a new risk analysis exercise?
6. Which other Mission planning processes should consider risks relating to SEA?

This Toolkit takes a victim-centred approach. In other words, it helps Missions to understand who in the population is most vulnerable to SEA, the impact of risks on victims and children born as result of SEA by UN personnel, and how to respond to risks in a way that respects their rights and dignity and protects them from harm.

The Toolkit is aligned with the UN's approach to Enterprise Risk Management<sup>3</sup>, and specifically to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) Guidelines on Enterprise Risk Management (2012).

## Who is the Toolkit for?

This Toolkit is primarily intended for use by conduct and discipline teams (CDTs) and conduct and discipline focal points in UN Field Missions led by DPKO or the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and supported by DFS. CDT experts and focal points are referred to as "users" in the Toolkit.

The Toolkit can also be used as a reference guide by all other Mission personnel with roles and responsibilities on managing risks relating to SEA by UN personnel. These include the Head of Mission and his/her leadership team, members of the Standing SEA Task Force and other mission managers and military and police commanders at all levels.

## How should the Toolkit be used?

The Toolkit contains guidance on how to identify, assess, treat and monitor risks relating to SEA by UN personnel as well as a series of practical tools containing formats and examples.

Missions should follow the risk management process described in steps 1 to 4 below, and use the tools as needed. The tools have been designed with multi-dimensional peace operations in mind that have civilian, police and military personnel. Users should

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<sup>3</sup> Enterprise Risk Management is defined in the 2012 guidelines as: "The process of coordinated activities designed to direct and control an organization with regard to risk, the effect of uncertainty on objectives. It is effected by governing bodies, management and other personnel, and applied in a strategic setting throughout the Organization".

therefore pick and choose which tools they require and adapt them to their context. Missions with small CDT capacities should also refer to the tips provided in **Box 9** (page 25)."

## What is a risk?

A risk is an uncertain event in the future that, if it happens, would affect the achievement of the Mission's objectives. Typically Missions have three key objectives on SEA. These are:

- Objective 1: To prevent SEA by UN personnel
- Objective 2: To enforce UN standards of conduct on SEA when it occurs (e.g. by investigating allegations of SEA)
- Objective 3: To assist victims of SEA and children born as a result of SEA by UN personnel

Although risks can also be positive opportunities that enhance the achievement of the Mission's work on SEA, this Toolkit will focus on risks that are negative threats that would harm the successful achievement of the Mission's objectives on SEA.

**A risk is an event that may or may not happen.** For example, a common challenge facing SEA investigations in the past has been the difficulty to substantiate what appears to be a genuine allegation because evidence has been unavailable or difficult to authenticate<sup>4</sup>. Some investigations will most likely suffer from this problem again in the future, but this is not certain to be the case in all future investigations. "The evidence in SEA cases is unavailable or difficult to authenticate" is therefore a risk because it is an uncertain event in the future that would harm the achievement of the UN Field Mission's objective of enforcing UN standards of conduct on SEA when it occurs (objective 2).

A risk is often confused with its cause or its consequence. **A risk has 1 or more causes: these causes are also known as "risk factors"**. For example, the evidence in SEA cases is sometimes unavailable or difficult to authenticate because it may have been improperly collected and contaminated in the process, witnesses may have moved away and can't be traced, and investigators may not have the specialist skills required to conduct a sexual violence investigation. It is important to understand these risk factors, since it may be possible to address some of these causes and thus reduce the likelihood of this risk happening. For example, Missions can address the problem of physical evidence being contaminated or lost by deploying an Immediate Response Team (IRT) in the immediate aftermath of an SEA allegation being reported, to collect and safeguard the evidence. This increases the likelihood that crucial evidence is kept safe until investigators arrive on the ground.

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<sup>4</sup> Not all SEA allegations end up being substantiated for good reason. For example, an investigation may find that an SEA allegation is unsubstantiated because it was a malicious complaint made in bad faith. In other cases, an SEA allegation may have been made in good faith but the evidence does not point to any wrong-doing.

**A risk also has 1 or more consequences.** For example, the risk that evidence in SEA cases is unavailable or difficult to authenticate would make it difficult to substantiate the SEA allegation, which in turn would result in impunity for perpetrators, further trauma and harm to victims or witnesses, a perception of a UN cover-up and damage to the Mission's credibility and mandate implementation. Again, it is important to understand the consequences of the risks, as these may also need to be addressed. For example, to minimize public perception of a UN cover-up in future SEA investigations where the evidence was difficult to authenticate, the Mission might need to conduct external communications activities now to explain the process of an SEA investigation and its challenges.

To take another example, in some missions, there have been cases in the past of UN personnel sexually exploiting a cleaner or cook that they have hired to work in their homes. The act of UN personnel sexually exploiting or abusing adult domestic workers in their private accommodation is therefore a risk in missions because it is an **uncertain event in the future, which may or may not happen, that would harm the achievement of the Mission's objective** of preventing SEA by UN personnel (objective 1).

### Box 1. Definition of risk

Risk is the effect of uncertainty on objectives<sup>5</sup>.

This risk has **1 or more causes or "risk factors"**. For example, some of the factors that drive this risk are the cultural attitudes of some UN personnel that condone sexual exploitation of adult domestic workers, the difficulty for the UN as an employer to detect acts of SEA taking

place in private accommodation, and the inherent vulnerability of domestic workers who may face destitution if they lose their jobs. Again, it is important to understand these risk factors, as the Mission may be able to address some of them. For instance, in this case, the Mission can tackle cultural attitudes of UN personnel that condone sexual exploitation of adult domestic workers through training and awareness-raising. This risk also has **1 or more consequences**. For example, the risk of UN personnel sexually exploiting adult domestic workers in their private accommodation would result in a number of consequences, including trauma and harm to victims, damage to the Mission's reputation and the possibility of harm to the perpetrator (e.g. blackmail or retaliation by the victim's relatives). Again, these consequences need to be identified ahead of time, and measures put in place now to address them. For example, putting in place a well-functioning referral system for victims of SEA is one practical way for Missions to address trauma to victims.

<sup>5</sup> Source: International Organization for Standardization, "ISO 31000: Risk Management 2009" (2009).



## What is risk management?

Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, treating and monitoring risks to the Mission's successful achievement of its objectives. In this Toolkit, the focus is on managing risks to the Mission's successful achievement of its objectives on SEA. The **SEA risk management process has 4 key steps and 10 actions** which are described in **Table 1** below. Communicating and coordinating on risks happens throughout the process.

**Table 1. The 4 Steps and 10 Actions of SEA Risk Management**

4 STEPS	10 ACTIONS
<b>STEP 1</b> <b>Understand the context and identify risks</b>	1. Analyse the external context, Mission profile and mandate and identify ALL risks to the Mission's objectives on SEA. Insert these into the risk register.
<b>STEP 2</b> <b>Assess risks</b>	2. Assess the likelihood of the risk occurring 3. Assess the impact of the risk on the objective 4. Assess the effectiveness of existing controls for the risk 5. Assess the severity of the residual risk 6. Identify the priority risks for the Mission to focus on
<b>STEP 3</b> <b>Treat risks</b>	7. Identify a risk treatment plan and insert this into the risk register <div>The SEA risk register is now complete and ready to use</div>
<b>STEP 4</b> <b>Monitor risks</b>	8. Use the risk register to review risks and take decisions on how best to address them 9. Conduct trend analysis to determine whether risks are changing 10. Conduct a new risk analysis when needed
<b>COMMUNICATE AND COORDINATE ON RISKS</b> <b>(done throughout)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Explain internally and externally how the Mission is addressing SEA risks</li> <li>Coordinate with others on SEA risk management</li> </ul>

**Box 2. DPKO-DFS Definition of Risk Management**

Risk management is the practical application of activities and methods that is used to guide organisational entities to identify, assess, evaluate and treat risks that can affect the ability to achieve objectives<sup>6</sup>.

After going through the risk management process, Missions will have everything they need to produce a “risk register”<sup>7</sup>. A risk register is a matrix listing key risks that threaten the successful achievement of the Mission’s three objectives on SEA as well as information on how the Mission will

address those risks. **Tool 1. Quick Guide to SEA Risk Management** provides a handy summary of the 4 steps and 10 actions in the SEA risk management process. It also includes a step-by-step example of how to use the SEA risk management process to produce a risk register.

**Box 3. DPKO-DFS Definition of a Risk Register**

Risk Register: Central repository of all risks and risk information. The register identifies each risk by category, and includes the definition of the risk, the rating result, contributing factors and other relevant information pertaining to that risk<sup>8</sup>.

## Who is responsible for risk management on SEA?

Risk management is a core management and command function. As such, Mission leadership, managers and commanders at all levels are responsible for addressing SEA risks relating to personnel under their supervision or command<sup>9</sup>.

*“Managers and commanding officers are responsible for taking steps to prevent and address misconduct on the part of their subordinates. Expected steps to be taken ...include ensuring that.....risks of misconduct are identified and appropriate measures recommended to prevent such risks are implemented accordingly.”*

Paragraph 14.1, DPA-DPKO-DFS Policy on  
Accountability for Conduct and Discipline in Field Missions (2015)

<sup>6</sup> Source: DPKO-DFS Guidelines on Enterprise Risk Management (2012).

<sup>7</sup> The risk register or “risk log” is the same as an “SEA Risk Management Framework” (referred to in code cable 2603 of 24 November 2015 entitled “Model Terms of Reference for SEA Standing Task Force and SEA Focal Point”).

<sup>8</sup> Source: DPKO-DFS Guidelines on Enterprise Risk Management (2012).

<sup>9</sup> Further details on the responsibilities of specific Mission leaders and managers on addressing misconduct can be found in paragraph 18 of the joint DPA-DPKO-DFS Policy on Accountability for Conduct and Discipline in Field Missions (2015).



#### Box 4. Who is on the Standing SEA Task Force?

The Standing SEA Task Force is chaired by the Chief of the CDT (where one is in place) or the Chief of Staff. Its membership is composed of the military, police and civilian components of the Mission, and typically includes offices such as Special Investigations, Military Police, UN Police, rule of law, gender, child protection, public information and integrated mission training<sup>10</sup>.

Although the Head of Mission is ultimately accountable for how SEA is addressed in a Mission, the Mission's CDT and its Standing SEA Task Force have specific responsibilities to support the Head of Mission in discharging his/her responsibilities in this area. Indeed, the CDT is the primary resource for the Head of Mission on all conduct and discipline matters, including SEA. The Standing SEA Task Force

is specifically responsible for developing a workplan detailing how the Mission will address SEA as well as for monitoring the SEA risk register and proposing updates to this risk register<sup>11</sup>.

### How does a risk register relate to the Mission's SEA workplan?

The work of the Standing SEA Task Force in a Mission should be guided by an annual workplan or "Mission SEA workplan" that describes the Mission's annual programme of work to prevent and address SEA by UN personnel<sup>12</sup>. **Tool 2. Sample Mission SEA Workplan** provides an example of a Mission SEA workplan<sup>13</sup>. The sample workplan consists of a narrative section, a logframe (i.e. a matrix summarizing the key elements of the workplan) and a monitoring plan.

**Tool 3. Sample Mission SEA Risk Register** provides an example of a risk register. The risk register relates directly to the corresponding SEA workplan since it describes the main risks to the achievement of the results described in the SEA workplan and how these will be addressed. **Tool 4. Format Mission SEA Risk Register** provides a format for a risk register in Excel.

**Tip** – Where there are significant regional differences within a Mission in how SEA should be addressed, it may be helpful to also have sector-specific SEA workplans and risk registers. These sector-specific SEA workplans and risk registers would be aligned with the overall Mission SEA workplan and risk register.



<sup>10</sup> Based on: code cable 2603 of 24 November 2015 entitled "Model Terms of Reference for SEA Standing Task Force and SEA Focal Point".

<sup>11</sup> See code cable 2603 of 24 November 2015 entitled "Model Terms of Reference for SEA Standing Task Force and SEA Focal Point".

<sup>12</sup> Ibid

<sup>13</sup> For further guidance on developing a workplan, see the [DPKO-DFS Planning Toolkit](#) (2012).

### Box 5. What should be included in a Mission SEA workplan?

A Mission SEA workplan should include:

1. A **narrative section** containing information such as: background, situation analysis, lessons learned from the previous year, results and priorities for the upcoming year, monitoring and evaluation, planning assumptions, risks and risk management, management and coordination structures, resources, review schedule.
2. A **logframe**<sup>14</sup> containing information such as: the main results (outcomes<sup>15</sup> and outputs<sup>16</sup>) that the Mission aims to achieve on SEA and key activities as well as roles and responsibilities and the status of implementation of the activities. This is the main document to use with the Standing SEA Task Force to discuss progress in implementing the workplan.
3. A **monitoring plan** containing information such as: indicators to measure progress towards the results in the workplan, indicators to monitor risks, information on baselines (i.e. the situation at the start of the planning period) and targets (i.e. the situation at the end of the planning period) as well as data sources.

## What does a risk management process look like?

Risk management is best done as a team effort: developing a risk register should involve all relevant parts of the Mission and members of the UN Country Team. This helps generate a common understanding of what are key SEA risks to the Mission's objectives and how best to address them. It also increases buy-in to the Mission's risk management plan. For example, in July 2017, the UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) ran a two-day workshop to produce its Mission SEA workplan and risk register for 2017-18. The workshop started with situation analysis aimed at getting a joint understanding of the external context, Mission profile and mandate for the year to come as well as risk identification to identifying likely threats to the Mission's objectives on SEA. Participants then identified the Mission's programme of work and followed the four-step risk management process described in this Toolkit to develop a risk register. Participants included members of the Standing SEA Task Force, conduct and discipline experts from field offices and representatives of UN agencies, funds and programmes.

Putting in place an SEA risk management process on SEA in a Mission for the first time will take dedicated time and effort. However, don't be put off. Once the basics are in place, risk management will become a lot easier and faster.

<sup>14</sup> DPKO-DFS officially defines a logical framework (logframe) as a "Management tool...used to identify...elements of a programme...(objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement, outputs and inputs)...and their casual relationships, as well as the assumptions and external factors that may influence success or failure..."

Source: [DPKO-DFS Planning Toolkit](#) (2012).

<sup>15</sup> Outcomes are produced as a result of the programme's outputs. For example, outcomes could be changes to behaviour, conditions, institutions, policies or laws. The Mission contributes to outcomes together with many other actors such as troop- and police-contributing countries, the Office of Internal Oversight Services, and UN Headquarters.

<sup>16</sup> Outputs are products, goods and/or services that are delivered by the programme. An output must always be fully within the capacity of the Mission to deliver.

## Step 1- Understand the context and identify risks

### What is the purpose of step 1?

The purpose of step 1 is:

- To understand the external context, Mission profile and mandate
- To identify all risks to the Mission's objectives on SEA
- To identify the causes and consequences of those risks
- To define what the SEA workplan should focus on

**Action 1. Analyse the external context, Mission profile and mandate and identify ALL risks to the Mission's objectives on SEA. Insert these into the risk register.**

➤ Conduct situation analysis to understand the external context as well as the Mission profile and mandate.

➤ Brainstorm and identify ALL risks to the Mission's objectives on SEA.

➤ Insert these risks into the risk register.

➤ The risk register should now include for each risk the following information: a risk ID, a description of the risk and its consequence(s), and a list of risk factors.

### How should Missions do situation analysis and risk identification?

A good understanding of the external context as well as the Mission profile<sup>17</sup> and mandate for the year to come is needed before risks can be identified. **Tool 5. Key Questions for SEA Situation Analysis** provides users with a list of key questions to guide situation analysis and the identification of SEA risks and risk factors. Once there is a good understanding of the environment in which the Mission is operating, users should identify ALL risks to the Mission's objectives on SEA and insert these into the risk register. To help with risk identification, **Tool 6. Examples of SEA Risks and Risk Factors** contains a list of examples of SEA-related risks and generic risk factors drawn from different Missions and contexts. These examples are purely illustrative. Each context and Mission will face its own unique risks and risk factors.

<sup>17</sup> The Mission profile consists of, for example, the number and type of UN personnel, the gender balance in the different components, the Mission's status as a non-family or family duty station, the locations used for rest and recuperation (R&R), the geographic coverage of the Mission, the number and location of field offices etc.



Tip – Look at the planning assumptions for the Mission SEA workplan. Some of these assumptions, if they don't hold true, will be risks or risk factors.

## How should Missions gather information on the situation and risks?

Information on the situation or risks can be gathered either through a one-off exercise, or on a rolling basis throughout the year through the Mission's routine conduct and discipline work (see **Box 6** below). In identifying SEA-related risks, Missions should also review recommendations from relevant external audits, evaluations and boards of inquiry.

### Box 6. Two different approaches to gathering information on the situation and risks

In 2016, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) conducted a one-off information gathering exercise to understand the external context and the specific types of SEA risks and risk factors in Cyprus. Data was collected over several weeks on a range of issues such as the nature of the commercial sex industry in Nicosia where all UN personnel are based, services available in Cyprus to victims of sexual violence, the profile of Mission personnel and what measures were already in place in the Mission to prevent SEA. Data was collected through a desk-based review of documents (e.g. reports from the UN Country Team, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and

Government of the Republic of Cyprus, media sources and internal staffing and security incident data from the Mission) as well as interviews with NGOs and embassies. The military, police and civilian components split the task of collecting the data. The information on the situation was used to identify SEA risks and risk factors, and subsequently used to develop the Mission's annual workplan on SEA and risk management approach. Since UN personnel are able to move freely throughout Cyprus, the situation analysis exercise covered the whole island rather than the Mission area, which is smaller.

As mentioned earlier in the Toolkit, in July 2017, MONUSCO conducted a two-day workshop to develop its Mission SEA workplan and risk register for 2017-18. The workshop included a session on situation analysis where political affairs and other experts from the Mission were asked to brief on the situation in the year to come. To identify risks, participants relied on their understanding of SEA risk and risk factors gathered through routine conduct and discipline work such as SEA risk assessment visits to contingent<sup>18</sup> locations, meetings with civil society representatives who are part of the Mission's community-based complaints mechanisms<sup>19</sup>, and their familiarity with past SEA cases.

<sup>18</sup> In this Toolkit, the term "contingent" refers to both a military contingent and a police contingent (i.e. a formed police unit).

<sup>19</sup> For further guidance on community-based complaints mechanisms, see code cable 0812 of 9 April 2015 entitled "Issuance of a draft SEA Complaint Reception Framework" and code cable 0037 of 8 January 2016 entitled "Follow-up on the Establishment of Community-based Complaint Reception Mechanisms". See also **Box 8**.

## What workshop techniques can Missions use to analyse the situation and identify risks?

When conducting situation analysis in a workshop setting, techniques such as [SWOT](#) analysis (Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) and [PESTLE](#) analysis (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal and Environmental) can be used to aid the analysis process. For example, SWOT analysis can be used to understand which of the Mission's approaches to addressing SEA are working well and where there are weaknesses that need to be addressed, as well as to identify external opportunities that the Mission can harness and external threats to the achievement of the Mission's objectives on SEA. The internal weaknesses and external threats are potential sources of risks that would harm the achievement of the Mission's objectives on SEA.

## What is the best way to describe a risk?

In the risk register, users should provide a description of the risk and its consequence(s). Users should also list separately the risk factors that cause the risk (see **Table 2** below). This provides a more detailed description of the risk, which makes it easier to identify ways to address the risk.

**Table 2. How to describe a risk in a risk register**

EXAMPLE OF A RISK DESCRIPTION	EXAMPLES OF RISK FACTORS
<p>The <b>evidence in SEA cases is unavailable or difficult to authenticate, which results in</b> difficulty in substantiating allegations of SEA, <b>which in turn results in</b> impunity for perpetrators, further trauma and harm to victims or witnesses, a perception of a UN cover-up and damage to the Mission's credibility and mandate implementation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Physical evidence has been contaminated or lost due to delays in the arrival of Troop-contributing country/UN investigators, or due to the passage of time (e.g. for historical allegations of SEA), or due to mishandling, improper storage or collection of evidence etc.</li> <li>■ Victims or witnesses disappear or move away and cannot be traced</li> <li>■ Victims/witnesses refuse to collaborate with the investigation</li> <li>■ Perpetrators give victim a false identity, or victims otherwise do not know the identity of the perpetrator, thereby making identification of the perpetrator difficult/impossible</li> <li>■ Investigators do not have specialist skills in conducting sexual violence investigations resulting in poor quality of evidence gathered and potentially increased harm to victims and witnesses</li> </ul>

## What information does step 1 produce?

**For the risk register.** At the end of step 1, the users should identify ALL risks to each of the Mission's three objectives on SEA and related risk factors and insert these into the risk register. The risk register should now include for each risk the following information: a risk ID, a description of the risk and its consequence(s), and a list of risk factors.



Tip – Think carefully about how detailed you want to be when listing risks. If your risk register is too long, those reviewing it will lose interest. If it's too short, some key risks may be missed. As a general rule, a risk register for a large Mission where the residual risk of UN personnel committing SEA is high is likely to have 10-15 SEA-related risks. To keep the risk register to a manageable length, check to see if you can merge similar risks into a more general one.



Tip – Insert the Mission's SEA objectives into the risk register and write the relevant risks under each objective.

**For the Mission SEA workplan.** Step 1 can help define which specific issues the Mission wishes to focus on in its annual workplan. For example, if the Mission will have more troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs) who are new to UN peacekeeping in the year to come, the SEA workplan may increase its focus on awareness-raising and training on UN standards of conduct for contingent personnel.

## Step 2 – Assess risks

### What is the purpose of step 2?

The purpose of step 2 is:

- To assess the likelihood of each risk occurring
- To assess the impact of each risk on an objective
- To assess the effectiveness of internal controls for each risk
- To assess the severity of the residual risk, after internal controls have been applied
- To prioritize risks and identify which risks should be the focus of the Mission's attention

Assessing risk is more of an art than a science. Although scales are provided to encourage a consistent approach, SEA risk assessment is essentially subjective and depends heavily on the user's understanding of the unique context in which the Mission operates. The ultimate aim of assessing risks is to identify which risks are a priority and should be the focus of the Mission's attention. The scores generated in step 2 are only useful in so far as they help with this thinking process.

#### Action 2. Assess the likelihood of the risk occurring

For each risk listed in the risk register, assess its likelihood of occurring in the future.

Score the likelihood of the risk using this scale: 1 (rare), 2 (unlikely), 3 (likely), 4 (highly likely), 5 (imminent).

Insert the score into the risk register. Repeat for all risks.

### How should Missions assess the likelihood of a risk?

When scoring the likelihood of a risk occurring, users are answering the question: "How likely is it that the risk will happen in the future?". Users should score the likelihood of the risk occurring on a scale of 1 to 5: 1 (rare), 2 (unlikely), 3 (likely), 4 (highly likely), 5 (imminent)<sup>20</sup>. The descriptions for each score can be found in **Table 1 in Tool 7. Scoring Tables to Assess SEA Risks**.

<sup>20</sup> This scale is based on the scoring scales used in Annex A of the "UN Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and Internal Controls Guide (2016)" (p. 34).



When deciding on a score, users should take into consideration two criteria: **certainty** and **frequency**. In other words, users need to ask themselves:

- How certain is it that the risk will occur?
- How frequently is this risk likely to occur?

For example, when developing a risk register for the upcoming year, users need to consider how certain it is that the risk will occur in the next twelve months, and how frequently is this risk likely to occur over the next twelve months. When deciding on a score, users should make a judgement, based on their understanding of the context and risk factors. If available, users should also examine any statistics on SEA for the UN Field Mission (e.g. past data on SEA allegations, cases, investigations and victims), since data on what has happened in the past can give a good indication of what is likely to happen in the future.

### Action 3. Assess the impact of the risk on the objective

- For each risk listed in the risk register, assess its expected impact on the objective.
- Score the impact of the risk using this scale: 1 (low), 2 (moderate), 3 (high), 4 (significant), 5 (critical).
- Insert this score into the risk register. Repeat for all risks.

## How should Missions assess the impact of a risk?

When scoring the impact of a risk on an objective, users are answering the question: “If the risk happens, how severe will its impact be on the objective<sup>21</sup> in the Mission’s SEA workplan?”. Users should score the impact of the risk on a scale of 1 to 5: 1 (low), 2 (moderate), 3 (high), 4 (significant), 5 (critical)<sup>22</sup>. The descriptions for each score can be found in **Table 2 in Tool 7. Scoring Tables to Assess SEA Risks**.

When deciding on a score, users should take into consideration four criteria, namely, the **reputational, operational, safety and security, and financial impact** of a risk.

<sup>21</sup> In **Tool 2. Sample Mission SEA Workplan**, the Mission’s three objectives on SEA are the same as the workplan’s “outcomes”.

<sup>22</sup> This scale is based on the scoring scales used in Annex A of the “UN Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and Internal Controls Guide (2016)” (p. 34)



In other words, users need to ask themselves:

- What impact will the risk have on the reputation of the Mission?
- What operational impact will the risk have on the Mission? In other words, what impact will it have on the achievement of the objective<sup>23</sup> in the Mission's SEA workplan, and will the risk have a broader impact on other mandated objectives?
- What impact will the risk have on the safety and security of UN personnel, of the population (including victims of SEA and children born as a result of SEA) and of UN partner organisations as well as on UN infrastructure, equipment and other assets?
- What impact will the risk have on the resources available to the Mission to implement its mandate?

Users should make their own judgement as to the relative weighting given to each of the four criteria, as this will be context specific. Understanding the external context, Mission profile and mandate is critical to assigning an impact score. For example, during political tense moments when spoilers may seek to undermine the Mission, the risk of UN personnel committing an egregious form of SEA may have a greater impact on mandate implementation than at other times. Again, if available, users should also examine any past data available on the impact of risks that occurred (e.g. on the reputational impact of past SEA allegations), since data on what has happened in the past can give a good indication of future impact.

### Box 7. Addressing the harm done to victims

SEA harms victims' minds and bodies and violates their dignity. It harms victims physically, for instance, causing physical injuries and resulting in unwanted pregnancy. It harms victims emotionally and psychologically, for example, triggering anxiety, depression and feelings of shame and guilt. It also harms victims socially and legally. In many countries, there are strict social norms about how women, men, girls and boys are expected to behave. When SEA occurs, families and communities may consider that victims have violated these social norms. As a result, victims may be beaten by their families, be forced to leave home, or lose their families' financial support. Victims may be ostracized by their communities. In some countries, victims may be arrested by the police, for instance, for sex outside of marriage.

The Mission's SEA workplan is the tool used to plan and deliver assistance to address the harm done to victims by SEA as well as to assist children born as a result of SEA. Risk management helps the Mission to be more effective in assisting victims and children born as a result of SEA by anticipating risks that may bring further harm or distress to them and putting in place measures to mitigate those risks. For example, where there is a risk that there are inadequate services available to victims of SEA in a particular area where the Mission is deployed, the Mission together with the UN Country Team can mitigate this risk by mapping out where the nearest adequate services are located and being ready to provide transportation to get there quickly.

<sup>23</sup> In **Tool 2. Sample Mission SEA Workplan**, the Mission's three objectives on SEA are the same as the workplan's "outcomes".

### Action 4. Assess the effectiveness of internal controls for the risk

For each risk, assess the effectiveness of the Mission's existing internal controls.

Score the effectiveness of internal controls using this scale:

1 (highly ineffective), 2 (ineffective), 3 (significant improvement needed),  
4 (limited improvement needed), 5 (effective)

Insert this score into the risk register. Repeat for all risks.

## What are internal controls?

Any action that is taken by the Mission to address a risk forms part of what is known as "internal control". These internal controls are listed as outputs and activities in the Mission's SEA workplan (see **Image 1.** below).

**Image 1. Screenshot of internal controls in the sample SEA workplan**

Internal controls to reduce the  
risk of UN personnel committing  
SEA



Output/deliverable	Key activities	Lead (support)	Status (comments)
Output 1: All UN personnel <b>know</b> what are the UN standards of conduct on SEA and their personal and managerial/commander responsibilities to address SEA	1.1. <i>Induction training</i> on SEA for all incoming staff, experts on mission and Military Staff Officers, including roll-out of two new mandatory on-line SEA courses	IMTC (CDT) – civilians  MTC (CDT) – experts on mission & Staff Officers	On schedule: All eligible personnel to have completed the mandatory SEA e-learning course by 31 Dec. 17; CDT Officer (P-4) to be recruited for locality A to work on induction training on SEA (by 31 Dec. 17)
	1.2.... <sup>2</sup>		
Output 2: <b>Monitoring, oversight, accountability and coordination mechanisms</b> on SEA are in place	2.1. Conduct of misconduct/ <b>SEA risk assessment visits</b> to contingent locations focused on SEA prevention	CDT (Brigade/Sector Commanders, HoOs, UNICEF, UNFPA)	Q 1: focus in Mission areas X, Y, Z
	2.2....		
Output 3: <b>Mission-specific policies and procedures</b> on SEA are enforced	3.1. Dissemination and updating of <b>existing mission-specific policies and procedures on SEA</b> (SRSG Memo on SEA, FC Directive on SEA, PC Directive on SEA, Lists of out-of-bounds locations)	OSRSG OFC OPC UNDSS	On schedule; Quarterly updates to lists of out-of-bounds locations
	3.2....		

All Missions put in place internal controls to reduce risks to the Mission's objectives on SEA. **Tool 8. 25 Examples of SEA Internal Controls** provides 25 examples of internal controls in Missions to reduce the likelihood and/or impact of SEA-related risks.

All Missions have a basic package of controls in place to reduce the likelihood of UN personnel committing SEA. However, Missions that face a higher risk will have a wide range of additional internal controls in place such as curfews and Mission-specific policies to restrict personnel movements and contact with the population when off-duty.

## How should Missions assess the effectiveness of internal controls?

When scoring the effectiveness of internal controls, users are answering the question: "How effective are the Mission's internal controls at reducing the likelihood and/or impact of this risk?". Users should score the effectiveness of internal controls on a scale of 1 to 5: 1 (highly ineffective), 2 (ineffective), 3 (significant improvement needed), 4 (limited improvement needed), 5 (effective)<sup>24</sup>. The descriptions for each score can be found in **Table 3 in Tool 7. Scoring Tables to Assess SEA Risks**. In deciding how to score, users should use subjective judgement as well as any data from formal SEA risk assessment visits to contingent camps and other locations that examine the adequacy of internal controls.

**Tool 9. Sample Format for a Misconduct/SEA Risk Assessment Visit** provides a sample template for a misconduct/SEA risk assessment visit to a contingent camp<sup>25</sup>. Tool 9 can be adapted and used to assess other locations such as UN field offices where civilian, police and military personnel are co-located as well as UN-provided accommodation for civilians. This risk assessment visit template assesses the effectiveness of a range of internal controls to reduce the risk of contingent personnel engaging in misconduct, including SEA, such as their awareness of UN standards of conduct and of Mission-specific policies restricting movements of uniformed personnel, entry/exit controls at the camp, camp perimeter security as well as welfare provision. This risk assessment visit template could also be enhanced by adding an overall rating using the 1-5 scale above of the effectiveness of internal controls to reduce the risk of SEA by contingent personnel.



**Tip** – During an SEA risk assessment visit, don't rely only on information from managers and commanders. Also, use direct observation, focus group discussions with UN personnel as well as meetings with local authorities, community-based complaints mechanisms and the population to build up a picture about the strength of internal controls. Meet separately with female UN personnel as their perspectives may differ from their male colleagues. Protect the anonymity of sources to prevent a backlash against anyone willing to point out weaknesses in internal controls.

<sup>24</sup> Source: Annex A, "UN ERM and Internal Control Guide" (p.34)

<sup>25</sup> This template is from 2016.

**Action 5. Assess the severity of the residual risk**

- For each risk, assess the severity of the residual risk, after the effectiveness of internal controls has been taken into account.
- Score the severity of the residual risk using this colour-coded scale: Very High (Red), High (Orange), Medium (Yellow), Low (Green).
- Insert this score into the risk register. Repeat for all risks.

## What is residual risk?

The residual risk is the risk after the effectiveness of internal controls has been taken into account. When scoring the severity of the residual risk, users are answering the question: How severe is the risk, after the effectiveness of existing internal controls has been taken into account? Users should score the risks on a 4-point scale that is colour-coded<sup>26</sup> using a traffic light system: Very High (Red), High (Orange), Medium (Yellow), Low (Green)<sup>27</sup>.

In deciding how to score the residual risk, users should use subjective judgement. The descriptions for each score can be found in **Table 4 in Tool 7. Scoring Tables to Assess SEA Risks**. As the severity of the risk increases, so does the level of attention given to it by Mission leadership, managers and commanders.



**Tip** – If the residual risk level is “Very High” or “High”, this may justify asking for additional resources to treat the risk. For example, if the residual risk of civilian personnel committing SEA in a specific location is “High” after taking into account the Mission’s internal controls, this may justify additional resources to be spent on expanding internal controls such as increasing the frequency of patrols of out-of-bounds locations.

**Action 6. Identify the priority risks for the Mission to focus on**

- Identify risks that are a priority for the Mission to consider: these should be the focus of the Mission’s efforts.

<sup>26</sup> If your risk register is in Excel, you will first have to select the appropriate score and then manually insert a colour for the cell (red, orange, yellow or green).

<sup>27</sup> Source: “UN ERM and Internal Control Guide” (2016)

## How to decide which risks are a priority?

Not all risks deserve equal attention. Mission leadership, managers and commanders have limited time and need to focus their attention on the biggest risks. The decision on which risks are a priority should be based partly on the severity of the residual risk (i.e. the more severe the residual risk, the more it is a priority) and partly on other factors. For instance, since all Missions have the responsibility first and foremost to try to prevent acts of SEA, risks to this objective will need to be prioritized. Other issues to consider include how urgent it is to address the risk, whether one risk needs to be tackled before another can be addressed, and the extent to which the Mission can influence the risk. The decision on which risks are a priority is best done in a consultative way involving, for instance, relevant parts of the Mission and members of the UN Country Team (see section “**What does a risk management process look like?**” on page 8). Community-based complaints mechanisms and local authorities can also provide helpful information on where the risk of UN personnel committing SEA is highest and which locations to prioritize over others.



Tip - Put the words “priority” in the risk description of priority risks. This gives a clear signal that the Mission should focus its attention on these risks.



Tip - Sort the risk register in descending order of severity of residual risk so that the “Very High” risks are at the top of the risk register and “Low” risks are at the bottom of the risk register. This will focus management’s attention on the more severe risks at the top of the list.

## What information does step 2 produce?

Users should now add to the risk register five different scores for each risk: a score for likelihood, for impact, for the effectiveness of internal controls and for the severity of residual risks.

Users then prioritize risks and identify which risks should be the focus of the Mission’s attention.

## Step 3 – Treat risks

### What is the purpose of step 3?

The purpose of step 3 is:

- To identify measures to respond to each risk
- To assign an action owner and due date to each risk response

#### Action 7. Identify a risk treatment plan and insert it into the risk register

For each residual risk, identify 1 or more risk response with an action owner and due date. Insert this information into the risk register.

### What is a risk treatment plan?

For each residual risk, identify your risk treatment plan. The risk treatment plan consists of a risk response(s) as well as an action owner and a date by which each risk response should be completed. Some risks will require several risk responses. In such cases, one action owner should be listed for each risk response.

When developing a risk treatment plan, users should always consider how they can avoid or reduce the negative impact of risks on victims and children born as result of SEA by UN personnel. For example, a risk treatment plan to treat the risk of an SEA investigation taking longer than it is supposed to should include actions to reduce the anxiety and trauma that this may cause to victims.

### What is a risk response?

The majority of the time, the Mission will be trying to implement risk responses that mitigate the risk i.e. that either reduce the likelihood of the risk occurring or reduce the impact of the risk. Risk responses therefore typically involve either expanding existing internal controls that are already included in the Mission's SEA workplan (e.g. increasing training activities for specific categories of UN personnel, or expanding SEA risk assessment visits) or doing something new altogether (e.g. adopting a new Mission-specific policy, or piloting a new approach).



**Tip** – In the risk register, do not repeat your internal controls under risk responses. Think of internal controls as the day-to-day, on-going, routine measures that the Mission has in place to address risks. Think of risk responses as extra measures implemented in addition to the internal controls.

A risk response usually addresses either a risk factor (e.g. weak complaints reception mechanisms) or a consequence of the risk (e.g. reputational damage to the Mission), which is why it is important in the risk register to identify not only the risk, but also its causes and consequences. That makes it possible to check whether the risk response is fit for purpose.



**Tip** - Make sure that the risk response is feasible to implement and cost-effective. Treating risks is likely to require additional staff time and other resources. In most cases, these extra costs can be funded using existing Mission resources.

## What is an action owner?

An action owner is the individual or office in the Mission that is responsible for implementing a risk response. Action owners do not necessarily carry out the actions themselves but may instead ensure that the most appropriate person under his/her supervision or command does. The Standing SEA Task Force needs to ensure that individuals or offices are aware that they have been identified as action owners for specific risk responses.

## What information does step 3 produce?

Users should now add to the risk register the following information for each risk: 1 or more risk response with an action owner and due date.

**The SEA risk register is now complete and ready to use.**

## Step 4 – Monitor risks

### What is the purpose of step 4?

The purpose of step 4 is:

- To monitor how risks are being addressed by the Mission
- To monitor whether risks facing the Mission are changing
- To determine if a new risk analysis exercise is needed

#### Action 8. Use the risk register to review risks and take decisions on how best to address them

- At least quarterly, the Standing SEA Task Force should meet to review the Mission SEA workplan and its risk register.
- During the meeting, use the risk register as a starting point to take decisions about risks and how to address them.
- After the meeting, circulate an updated risk register that reflects any changes agreed to at the meeting. Don't forget to date the risk register.

### How to use the risk register with the Standing SEA Task Force

At least quarterly, the Standing SEA Task Force should meet to review the Mission SEA workplan and its risk register<sup>28</sup>. When reviewing the risk register, the Standing SEA Task Force should consider the situation in the upcoming three-month period (and beyond) and ask questions such as:

- Are the risks listed in the risk register still relevant? Should any new risks be added?
- Is the list of priority risks still accurate? Have new priority risks emerged? Should any risk be downgraded and no longer be considered a priority?
- Are the scores for the risks and internal controls still accurate?
- Do any severe risks need to be escalated to Mission leadership to address?
- What is the trend for each risk? Is the risk remaining constant, or increasing or decreasing?
- What is the status of implementation of risk responses? Are they on schedule? Can any risk responses be marked as “completed”?

<sup>28</sup> See code cable 2603 of 24 November 2015 entitled “Model Terms of Reference for SEA Standing Task Force and SEA Focal Point”.



The risk register should be treated as a living document. This means that any new risks that appear outside of the scheduled meetings of the Standing SEA Task Force should be added to the register, and if needed, an extraordinary meeting of the task force called to discuss how to address it. If the risk register is not regularly updated, it will quickly become stale and reviewers will lose interest.



**Tip** – When a new risk is added, put the words “new” in the risk description. When a risk response is completed, leave it in the risk register and add the words “completed”.

## How to use other Mission management structures to discuss SEA risks

In addition to the Standing SEA Task Force, other Mission management and command structures should also be used to regularly monitor SEA risks and how they are addressed. For example, severe SEA risks that require the attention of Mission leadership should be discussed at Senior Mission Leadership meetings. At the mid-management level, management retreats, contingent commander conferences and weekly police component briefings are useful fora to discuss whether SEA risks affecting their personnel are changing and to discuss how best to address them. SEA risks that may have impact on the safety and security of UN personnel should also be considered by the Security Management Team during the UN Security Risk Management process. SEA risks that appear on the mission risk register should be discussed in the Mission’s quarterly Risk Management Committee meetings<sup>29</sup> (see section “**SEA risk in Mission-level planning**” on page 27).

## How to monitor risks and risk treatment for specific locations

In the sectors/regions, a Mission may wish to have a more detailed tracking of risk treatment and may wish to monitor risk response measures by location. In such cases, Missions should use **Tool 10. Format SEA Risk Assessment Visit Tracking**. This is an Excel format to enable more detailed tracking of risks and risk treatment measures recommended by SEA risk assessment visits to contingent camps, UN offices and other UN premises.



**Tip** – When preparing for an SEA risk assessment visit, check whether there are any outstanding risk treatment measures from the previous visit.

### Action 9. Conduct trend analysis to determine whether risks are changing

Use a combination of quantitative and qualitative data to build up a picture of how risks are evolving over time.

<sup>29</sup> See code cable 2665 of 28 December, 2016 entitled “Terms of Reference for Risk Managers, Risk Management Committee and Quarterly ERM Reporting”

## How to monitor whether SEA risks are changing

One approach to analysing whether SEA risks are changing is to do trend analysis at the end of the year, using the risk register. Assuming that the Standing SEA Task Force meets at least once a quarter, by the end of the year Missions will have the original risk register and three updates. This enables Mission to do trend analysis and look at how risks have evolved over the past year. These past trends can give an indication of what to expect in the future. For example, if the level of risk that “There are no medical or other services in the vicinity of where victims live, resulting in victims receiving no or inadequate immediate assistance, or delayed assistance” has remained constant throughout the year, it may mean that the current risk treatment strategy is not working and that it’s time to try a new approach.

Another approach to analysing whether risks are changing is to monitor quantitative indicators of risks and to supplement this with qualitative information on risks. For example, the Mission SEA workplan will have a monitoring plan that includes quantitative performance indicators. The Standing SEA Task Force should include among these performance indicators some quantitative indicators to monitor risks. For example, an indicator measuring the number of SEA investigations in a given year that have the status of pending six months after the allegation was reported measures the extent to which the “risk that the SEA investigation takes longer than the prescribed time to complete” has occurred<sup>30</sup>. However, monitoring these quantitative indicators of risks over time will not be enough to understand whether risk levels are changing or remaining constant. Such quantitative data should be supplemented with qualitative data such as the views on changing risks and risk factors of CDT experts, UN investigators, UN partners and community-based complaints networks (see **Box 8** below).

### Box 8. Tracking changing risk levels through community-based complaints mechanisms

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), MONUSCO has set up a number of community-based complaints mechanisms (CBCMs) in areas facing a higher risk of UN personnel committing SEA. These mechanisms are composed of civil society representatives from the surrounding communities who help conduct outreach on SEA issues and channel complaints. These community-based complaints mechanisms have alerted the Mission to changing risks and risk factors. For example, one community-based complaints mechanism alerted the CDT in MONUSCO that the risk of contingent personnel committing in SEA was increasing in a specific location, as they had noticed new brothels opening up near the UN military camp. This allowed the Mission to be aware of increasing risk levels early on and to adopt new targeted risk response measures.

<sup>30</sup> The UN Secretary-General has requested that SEA investigations by OIOS or the Mission are to be completed within 6 months of the date of reporting of the allegation to the UN or within 3 months where an expedited timeline is requested by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General has recommended that SEA investigations referred to Member States are to be completed within the same timeframes. SEA investigations referred by OIOS to the Mission to investigate are expected to be completed within 3 months of the date of referral.

**Action 10. Conduct a new risk analysis when needed**

▶ This may be necessary when there is a significant change in the external context, the Mission's mandate and/or profile.

**When to conduct a new risk analysis**

There will be times when it is necessary to conduct a new risk analysis. This may be necessary when there is a significant change in the external context, the Mission mandate and/or profile. For example, if a new UN Security Council mandate requires a sudden increase in the number of UN personnel and deployments to new parts of the country, this will require a re-think of the Mission's approach to SEA and how it manages SEA risks.

**Box 9. How to use the Toolkit in a low risk mission with a small conduct and discipline capacity**

Missions where historically there have been few incidents of misconduct by UN personnel typically have small conduct and discipline teams (e.g. 2-3 persons) or the conduct and discipline function is carried out by a single focal point (who also has another full-time job). Here are some tips on how to use the Toolkit in missions with few staff to dedicate to conduct and discipline issues:

- Use the Toolkit to develop a "Mission-wide misconduct workplan and risk register" that covers all forms of misconduct (e.g. drunk driving, theft), including SEA. Regional conduct and discipline capacities can develop a regional misconduct workplan and regional risk register covering several missions.
- Be efficient and combine risk assessment activities with other routine conduct and discipline tasks. For example, when planning a visit to a field location to conduct awareness raising and training on SEA prevention, add on some extra time to conduct an SEA risk assessment visit.
- Share the workload with other Mission components. For example, ask Mission leadership to assign staff from another Mission component to help write the first version of the Mission-wide misconduct workplan and risk register. Another suggestion is to set up a network of SEA focal points in field offices who can help with SEA risk assessments, monitor implementation of risk mitigation measures and help update the risk analysis.
- Follow the same 4-step risk management process described in this Toolkit, but do each step in a lighter touch way. For example:
  - Instead of conducting an in-depth risk assessment exercise, convene a two-hour meeting of the Standing SEA Task Force and brainstorm together

on key misconduct risks facing the Mission, including SEA-related risks. Instead of producing a stand-alone risk analysis report, note the key points from the risk analysis in minutes of the meeting. In steady-state Missions facing a similar situation year-on-year, it may only be necessary to conduct an annual, light touch refresh of the risk analysis on SEA.

- Rely on the conduct and discipline team or focal point to assess the risks and identify risk treatment measures. This approach is less participatory but it's quicker and less resource intensive.
- Give other Mission components a chance to comment on the draft Mission-wide misconduct workplan and risk register before it is finalized. After that, if the situation remains largely the same, only update the Mission-wide misconduct workplan and risk register annually.
- Do monitor changes to risks every quarter. However, to save time, brief Mission leadership, managers and commanders verbally about whether risks are changing. Note key changes to risks in the minutes of the meeting instead of updating the Mission-wide misconduct risk register every quarter.

## Communicate and coordinate on risks

### Communicate and coordinate on risks

- Explain internally and externally how the Mission is addressing SEA risks.
- Coordinate with others on SEA risk management.
- This should happen throughout the risk management process.

By anticipating problems that the Mission is likely to face when implementing its programme of work on SEA, risk management can help the Mission be pro-active in communicating on SEA. Indeed, good communication now can mitigate the impact of problems that happen later on. The Mission's communications strategy on SEA should include messages for both internal and external audiences describing key risks facing the Mission on SEA and how the Mission is addressing them. For example, MONUSCO's Communications Strategy for 2016 includes a message informing audiences about the existence of a risk management approach as well as messages providing practical examples of how the Mission is mitigating risks to its objectives on SEA.

Managing SEA risks is a collective effort, involving all parts of the Mission as well as other UN entities, UN Headquarters who play a key role in liaising with troop- and police-contributing countries, the host government and local communities. For example, to mitigate the risk that victims and other members of the population do not report SEA by UN personnel, the Mission will need to put in place good complaints mechanisms and conduct external communications activities to explain to the population what are the UN standards of conduct on SEA and how to report complaints. These risk treatment measures will require the Mission to coordinate with members of the UN Country Team, the host government and civil society.

## Addressing SEA risks in other planning processes

### SEA risks in Mission component-level planning

When Mission components conduct planning and risk management for their own areas of work, they should also consider whether there are any SEA-related risks. For example, the Mission support component should consider how it can design UN contingent camps with sufficient space inside the camp for outdoor games/sports so as to reduce the need for contingent members to be outside of their barracks while off-duty and thereby reduce the likelihood of SEA being committed. Similarly, when military deployments are being planned to remote locations, it needs to be considered whether additional SEA risk mitigation measures are needed such as increasing the frequency of oversight visits by senior military commanders. When security risk assessments are being conducted, the impact of new SEA allegations on the safety and security of Mission personnel should also be assessed.

#### Box 10. SEA risk management and “do no harm”

During mandate implementation, risk management assists Mission managers and commanders to implement the mandate in a way that minimizes harm to the population. For example, when planning a deployment of civilian and uniformed personnel to a new location, risk management can help managers and commanders identify specific SEA-related risks for that location (e.g. population fleeing conflict who are likely to settle near UN camps in search of protection) and mitigate those risks (e.g. by prioritizing the establishment of a community-based complaints mechanism in that location, which will conduct awareness raising with the population on UN standards of conduct on SEA).

### SEA risks in Mission-level planning

The Mission’s SEA risk register should not be confused with the overall “mission risk register”. The Mission’s SEA risk register describes in granular detail how the Mission will address risks to objectives on one issue, namely, addressing sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel. In contrast, the mission risk register explains how the Mission will address



the whole universe of risks facing the Mission as it implements all of its mandated objectives. As can be expected, the Mission's SEA risk register will be more detailed and contain possibly up to 10-15 SEA-related risks, whereas the mission risk register will typically include only one SEA-related risk and provide a high-level overview of how the Mission will address this risk.



**Tip** – In the mission risk register, a typical SEA-related risk might be described as “The risk that UN personnel commit SEA with the population”. In contrast, in the Mission's SEA risk register, there may be several entries for this type of risk, describing the risk in greater detail e.g. “UN civilians and experts on mission sexually exploit or abuse adult domestic workers in their private accommodation”.

An example of an SEA risk from a sample mission risk register is included below (see **Image 2** below). Further guidance on how to develop inputs into a mission risk register and how to score risks at this level can be found in “UN ERM and Internal Control Guide” (2016).

**Image 2. Excerpt of a mission risk register<sup>31</sup> that includes an SEA risk**

13. Professional Conduct: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (2.2.4)	Risk category	Impact	Likelihood	Internal Control Effectiveness	Residual Risk	Risk Owner
	Governance	4 – Significant	4 – Highly likely	4 – Limited improvement needed	High	Mission, CDT
<b>Definition and Key Drivers</b>		<b>Internal Controls</b>			<b>Risk Response</b>	
<p>Mission civilian, police and military personnel commit acts of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) with the population, resulting in harm to victims and children born as a result of SEA, damage to the reputation of the Organization and damage to the ability of the Mission to implement its mandate, including its protection of civilians and human rights mandate.</p> <p>Key drivers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Poor economic situation in Mission areas, including severe food shortages and lack/limited access to employment, which increases the vulnerability of the population to SEA</li> <li>Cultural attitudes of the population that tolerate or condone transactional sex between women/girls and Mission personnel</li> <li>Open commercial sex industry as prostitution is not a criminal offence in the host State</li> <li>Populations displaced by conflict or insecurity settle close to Mission base camps in search of protection, increasing their vulnerability to SEA</li> <li>Proximity of Mission base camps to residential areas</li> <li>Poor pre-deployment training on UN standards of conduct on SEA for specific contingents</li> <li>Cultural attitudes of Mission personnel that tolerate or condone transactional sex with women/girls</li> <li>Lack of effective command and control over contingent personnel</li> <li>Deployment of some contingents for more than 12 months without rest and recuperation breaks</li> </ul>		<p>Internal controls to prevent acts of SEA, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Internal and external communications activities</li> <li>In-mission training programme on SEA</li> <li>Mission-specific policies and procedures on SEA</li> <li>UN patrols of out-of-bounds locations and curfews</li> <li>Mission SEA Task Force and networks of SEA focal points in field locations</li> <li>Field-level SEA risk assessment visits</li> </ul> <p>Internal controls to enforce UN standards of conduct when SEA occurs, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Complaints mechanisms, including community-based complaints networks in field locations where there is a higher risk of SEA</li> <li>Referral of SEA allegations for investigation by OIOS or Member States and SEA investigations by the Mission's Special Investigations Unit</li> <li>Use of an Immediate Response Team to collect and safeguard evidence of SEA</li> </ul> <p>Internal controls to assist victims and children born as a result of SEA, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Referral of victims to immediate and longer-term assistance and facilitation of paternity and child support claims</li> <li>Follow up with Member States on the status and outcome of SEA cases</li> </ul>			<p>Implementation of a Mission SEA risk management plan that includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Visits to select Member States to strengthen pre-deployment training on SEA</li> <li>Monitoring completion of in-mission training on SEA</li> <li>More frequent SEA risk assessment visits and oversight visits by Mission leadership to contingents at higher risk of committing SEA</li> <li>Awareness raising activities targeting the population implemented by community-based complaints mechanisms</li> <li>Strengthening UN mechanisms to refer victims to assistance</li> </ul>	

## SEA risk management at UN Headquarters

**Established missions.** The Mission will have to work in partnership with UN Headquarters and Member States to mitigate many SEA risks. For example, UN Headquarters plays an

<sup>31</sup> Information as of October 2017.

important role in following up on paternity claims with Member States, which helps mitigate the risk of children born as a result of SEA not receiving child support. Similarly, TCCs and PCCs can mitigate the risk of their personnel committing SEA while deployed in the Mission area, for example, through providing high quality pre-deployment training on UN standards of conduct on SEA, appointing effective contingent commanders who are able to maintain good order and discipline and through adequate welfare provision while on deployment.

**New mission start-ups.** During Headquarters planning processes such as the development of a Mission Concept for a new Mission, there will also be a need to consider SEA-related risks. For instance, a Technical Assessment Mission (TAMs) should assess the severity of the risk of UN personnel committing SEA as well as the staffing resources required to address this risk (e.g. the size of the CDT needed).

**Downsizing, liquidation and transition of a Mission to other arrangements** will change the nature of SEA-related risks facing the Mission and trigger the need for a new risk analysis. For example, in downsizing missions, civilian components may be withdrawn from remote field offices ahead of uniformed components, which will change the nature of SEA-related risks in those locations. As a Mission closes and international personnel leave, there may also be an increased risk of new SEA allegations being made after UN personnel depart as well as a risk that unresolved SEA-related paternity and child support claims against UN personnel damage the Mission's reputation and transition activities. Both Headquarters and Missions have an important role to play in preparing for these risks ahead of time, and putting in place measures to mitigate them.

# PART II: TOOLS





## Tool 1. Quick Guide to SEA Risk Management

4 STEPS	10 ACTIONS	HOW TO?
<b>STEP 1</b> <b>Understand the context and identify risks</b>	1. Analyse the external context, Mission profile and mandate and identify ALL risks to the Mission's objectives on SEA. Insert these into the risk register.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Conduct situation analysis to understand the external context as well as the Mission profile and mandate.</li> <li>■ Brainstorm and identify ALL risks to the Mission's objectives on SEA.</li> <li>■ Insert these risks into the risk register.</li> <li>■ The risk register should now include for each risk the following information: a risk ID, a description of the risk and its consequence(s), and a list of risk factors.</li> </ul>

### Step 1 example

Risks to Outcome 1 (Prevention)	Risk ID	Risk and its consequence(s)	Risk factors (causes of the risk)
	1	Mission personnel commit SEA with children	Cultural attitudes of the population that tolerate or condone exchange of money or gifts for sex...High numbers of vulnerable street children around UN camps.
	2	Civilians and experts on mission engage in transactional sex with adults	Cultural attitudes of UN personnel that tolerate or condone transactional sex between consenting adults.... Difficulty to detect SEA taking place in private accommodation of UN personnel creates a sense of impunity.
	3	Military and police contingent personnel engage in transactional sex with adults	Low awareness of specific contingents of UN standards of conduct on SEA on arrival in mission area...Weak command and control over contingents.
	4...	...	...

4 STEPS	10 ACTIONS	HOW TO?
<b>STEP 2</b> <b>Assess risks</b>	2. Assess the likelihood of the risk occurring  3. Assess the impact of the risk on the objective  4. Assess the effectiveness of existing controls for the risk  5. Assess the severity of the residual risk	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ For each risk listed in the risk register:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Assess its likelihood of occurring in the future using this scale: 1 (rare), 2 (unlikely), 3 (likely), 4 (highly likely), 5 (imminent).</li> <li>b) Assess its expected impact on the objective using this scale: 1 (low), 2 (moderate), 3 (high), 4 (significant), 5 (critical).</li> <li>c) Assess the effectiveness of the Mission's existing internal controls for the risk using this scale: 1 (highly ineffective), 2 (ineffective), 3 (significant improvement needed), 4 (limited improvement needed), 5 (effective).</li> <li>d) Assess the severity of the residual risk (after the effectiveness of internal controls has been taken into account) using this colour-coded scale: Very High (Red), High (Orange), Medium (Yellow), Low (Green).</li> </ul> </li> <li>■ Insert all scores into the risk register.</li> <li>■ Repeat for all risks.</li> </ul>

## Step 2 example

Risks to Outcome 1 (Prevention)	Risk ID	Risk and its consequence(s)	Risk factors (causes of the risk)	Likelihood	Impact	Effectiveness of internal controls	Severity residual risk (after internal controls)
	1	Mission personnel commit SEA with children	Cultural attitudes of the population that tolerate or condone exchange of money or gifts for sex...High numbers of vulnerable street children around UN camps.	Highly likely (4)	Critical (5)	Limited improvement needed (4)	High
	2	Civilians and experts on mission engage in transactional sex with adults	Cultural attitudes of UN personnel that tolerate or condone transactional sex between consenting adults.... Difficulty to detect SEA taking place in private accommodation of UN personnel creates a sense of impunity.	Highly likely (4)	Critical (5)	Limited improvement needed (4)	High
	3	Military and police contingent personnel engage in transactional sex with adults	Low awareness of specific contingents of UN standards of conduct on SEA on arrival in mission area...Weak command and control over contingents.	Imminent (5)	Critical (5)	Limited improvement needed (4)	Very High
	4....	...	...				

4 STEPS	10 ACTIONS	HOW TO?
<b>STEP 2</b> <b>Assess risks</b>	6. Identify the priority risks for the Mission to focus on.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Identify risks that are a priority for the Mission to consider: these should be the focus of the Mission's efforts.</li> <li>■ Put the words "priority" in the risk description of priority risks. This gives a clear signal that the Mission should focus its attention on these risks.</li> <li>■ Sort the risk register in descending order of severity of residual risk so that the "Very High" risks are at the top of the risk register and "Low" risks are at the bottom of the risk register. This will focus management's attention on the more severe risks at the top of the list.</li> </ul>

## Step 2 example continued

Risks to Outcome 1 (Prevention)	Risk ID	Risk and its consequence(s)	Risk factors (causes of the risk)	Likelihood	Impact	Effectiveness of internal controls	Severity residual risk (after internal controls)
	3	Military and police contingent personnel engage in transactional sex with adults <b>[Priority]</b>	Low awareness of specific contingents of UN standards of conduct on SEA on arrival in mission area...Weak command and control over contingents.	Imminent (5)	Critical (5)	Limited improvement needed (4)	<b>Very High</b>
	1	Mission personnel commit SEA with children <b>[Priority]</b>	Cultural attitudes of the population that tolerate or condone exchange of money or gifts for sex...High numbers of vulnerable street children around UN camps.	Highly likely (4)	Critical (5)	Limited improvement needed (4)	<b>High</b>
	2	Civilians and experts on mission engage in transactional sex with adults <b>[Priority]</b>	Cultural attitudes of UN personnel that tolerate or condone transactional sex between consenting adults.... Difficulty to detect SEA taking place in private accommodation of UN personnel creates a sense of impunity.	Highly likely (4)	Critical (5)	Limited improvement needed (4)	<b>High</b>
	4....	...	...				

4 STEPS	10 ACTIONS	HOW TO?
<b>STEP 3</b> <b>Treat risks</b>	7. Identify a risk treatment plan and insert this into the risk register	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ For each residual risk, identify 1 or more risk response with an action owner and due date.</li> <li>■ Insert this information into the risk register.</li> </ul> <p><b>The SEA risk register is now complete and ready to use</b></p>

**Step 3 example**

Risks to Outcome 1 (Prevention)	Risk ID	Risk and its consequence(s)	...	Effectiveness of internal controls	Severity residual risk (after internal controls)	Risk response	Action owner	Due date
	3	Military and police contingent personnel engage in transactional sex with adults <b>[Priority]</b>		Limited improvement needed (4)	Very High	(i) Pre-deployment advisory visits to troop- and police-contributing countries to strengthen quality of pre-deployment training on SEA	CDT	Quarter (Q)1: Visit to [Member State] by end August 2017
						...(iii) More frequent oversight visits by Mission leadership to high risk locations....	CDT	Q1: Focus on.. locations X,Y...
	1	Mission personnel commit SEA with children <b>[Priority]</b>		Limited improvement needed (4)	High	Development of new multimedia and radio content on prevention of SEA with children, for use by CBCMs	CDT	Q2 By 31 December 2017
	2	Civilians and experts on mission engage in transactional sex with adults <b>[Priority]</b>		Limited improvement needed (4)	High	Deployment of CDT P-4 Officer to strengthen SEA training at induction in duty station X	CDT	Q2 By 31 December 2017
	4....	...						

4 STEPS	10 ACTIONS	HOW TO?
<b>STEP 4</b> <b>Monitor risks</b>	<p>8. Use the risk register to review risks and take decisions on how best to address them</p> <p>9. Conduct trend analysis to determine whether risks are changing</p> <p>10. Conduct a new risk analysis when needed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ At least quarterly, the Standing SEA Task Force should meet to review the Mission SEA workplan and its risk register.</li> <li>■ During the meeting, use the risk register as a starting point to take decisions about risks and how to address them.</li> <li>■ After the meeting, circulate an updated risk register that reflects any changes agreed to at the meeting. Don't forget to date the risk register.</li> <li>■ Use a combination of quantitative and qualitative data to build up a picture of how risks are evolving over time.</li> <li>■ This may be necessary when there is a significant change in the external context, the Mission's mandate and/or profile.</li> </ul>
<b>COMMUNICATE AND COORDINATE ON RISKS</b>  (done throughout)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Explain internally and externally how the Mission is addressing SEA risks</li> <li>■ Coordinate with others on SEA risk management</li> </ul> <p>This should happen throughout the risk management process.</p>	



## Tool 2. Sample Mission SEA Workplan

### Sample SEA Workplan (1 July 2017-30 June 2018)

#### 1. Background

*External context, mission mandate and profile.* During the planning period, the Mission is mandated to implement UN Security Council resolution X that is focused on supporting implementation of a political agreement and Presidential elections, protection of civilians and stabilisation. The Mission budget provides for the deployment of up to 10,000 uniformed personnel and 2,000 civilian personnel (close to two thirds of whom are national staff). During the planning period, the Mission will continue to downsize.

Political tensions are expected to increase in the lead up to the elections, and also if the elections are postponed. Any new allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by the Mission personnel during this period of heightened tension could have a greater negative impact on the Mission's mandate implementation, credibility and relationship with the host government than at other times.

*Level of SEA risk facing the Mission.* In 2017-18, the likelihood of the Mission personnel committing SEA with the population is rated as "4- Highly likely" and the impact on the Mission's mandated objectives as "4-Significant". The Mission has in place extensive measures to prevent SEA (see **section 4** below). However, the Mission has little or no influence over many of the factors that drive the risk of the Mission personnel committing SEA. The Mission's internal controls to address SEA are thus currently rated as "4-Limited improvement needed", and the residual risk of the Mission personnel committing SEA remains "High"<sup>1</sup>. For further details, see the sample mission risk register.

#### 2. Results and priorities for 2017-18

**Results.** The Mission SEA workplan describes the Mission's comprehensive package of measures in place to prevent SEA, enforce UN standards on SEA, and assist victims and

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<sup>1</sup> For further details, see the sample mission risk register.

children born as a result of SEA. These measures include numerous internal controls to reduce SEA-related risks facing the Mission. The workplan for 2017-18 contains 11 planned outputs (or deliverables) to meet the following three outcomes:

1. Acts of SEA of the population by the Mission personnel are prevented
2. UN standards of conduct on SEA are enforced, when SEA occurs
3. Victims of SEA and children born as result of SEA by the Mission personnel are assisted

A detailed description of the outputs, key activities and their status of implementation as well as roles and responsibilities can be found in **Annex A (Logframe)**. In implementing its workplan, the Mission will take a victim-centred approach (e.g. ensuring that victim's medical needs are prioritized over evidence gathering during UN investigations, and that victims and witnesses are protected from threats and other harm). The Mission will also ensure that gender differences are taken into account during the design and implementation of workplan activities (e.g. victim assistance will also take into account the different social and medical consequences of SEA for women and girls compared to men and boys).

**Priorities.** In 2017-18, the three priorities are: preventing acts of SEA by UN personnel, with a continued focus on training (output 1); protecting and assisting victims and children born as a result of SEA (particularly outputs 9, 10 and 11); and referring allegations of SEA for investigation in a timely manner.

### 3. Monitoring and evaluation

**Monitoring results and risks.** A monitoring plan is attached in **Annex B (Monitoring Plan)** containing indicators to measure progress towards the workplan's outcomes as well as information on baselines, targets and data sources. This monitoring plan also includes indicators to measure the six risks identified as "priority risks" (see **section 5**.) Data on all indicators will be collected every quarter. Analysis of the data will be presented to the Mission SEA Task Force, and used to inform decision-making about the workplan. This monitoring data will be supplemented with qualitative information on progress towards results in the workplan from Community-based Complaints Mechanisms (CBCMs) and other sources. Monitoring of outputs will be done through the quarterly and yearly reporting requirements to the Conduct and Discipline Unit at UN Headquarters.

**Evaluating results.** At the end of the year, the Mission Conduct and Discipline Team (CDT) will conduct a rapid review of the workplan with the purpose of assessing results achieved, identifying good practices and lessons as well as developing recommendations to inform the design of the next workplan.

## 4. Planning assumptions

For the results in the workplan to be achieved, the following planning assumptions are made:

- Incoming personnel have been screened for a prior history of SEA while employed or deployed with UN peacekeeping (e.g. by UN Headquarters, the UN Volunteer (UNV) Programme, Member States)
- Military and police commanders exercise good command and control over their contingents<sup>2</sup>
- Mission leadership, managers and commanders make it clear that addressing SEA is a priority
- Troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs) deploy contingents that have received adequate pre-deployment training on UN standards of conduct on SEA
- TCC/PCCs provide contingents with adequate welfare and recreation facilities in the Mission area
- TCC/PCCs provide contingents with rest and recuperation (R&R) breaks when deploying them for up to twelve months
- The population, including victims, are willing to report allegations of SEA to the UN
- During SEA investigations, evidence is available and able to be authenticated
- SEA investigations are completed within six months (or within three months in expedited cases)<sup>3</sup>
- UN Headquarters approves the Mission's recommendations for administrative, interim and/or disciplinary measures in SEA cases
- Medical and other services are available close to where victims are located
- The Prevention of SEA (PSEA) Network used to refer victims to services functions effectively
- Member States provide information on the status and outcome of SEA cases involving uniformed and other personnel

<sup>2</sup> The term contingents refers to both military contingents and formed police units.

<sup>3</sup> The Secretary-General has requested that SEA investigations by OIOS or the Mission are to be completed within 6 months of the date of reporting of the allegation to the UN or within 3 months where an expedited timeline is requested by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General has recommended that SEA investigations referred to Member States are to be completed within the same timeframes. SEA investigations referred by OIOS to the Mission to investigate are expected to be completed within 3 months of the date of referral.

## 5. Risks and risk management

A risk register for this workplan is attached in **Annex C (Risk Register)**. The risk register will be reviewed by the Mission SEA Task Force and updated on a quarterly basis. The CDT will be responsible for updating the risk register, on behalf of the Mission SEA Task Force. A new risk assessment will be conducted at the end of the workplan (June 2018), unless there is a significant change in the external context, Mission mandate and profile before that time.

There are six priority risks, which are marked as “priority” in the risk register, namely, risks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10 (see **Annex C (Risk Register)**). The CDT will monitor priority risks on a quarterly basis using the quantitative and qualitative indicators listed in **Annex B (Monitoring Plan)**.

## 6. Management and coordination structures

**Mission-level management structures.** The Mission SEA workplan 2017-18 is owned by the Head of Mission, who is ultimately accountable for addressing SEA in the Mission. To assist him in discharging this responsibility, the Mission SEA Task Force, composed of all Mission components, representatives of the UN Country Team and CDT, is responsible for overseeing the implementation of this workplan and reviewing the risk register. The SEA Task Force is expected to meet at least quarterly to review the implementation of the workplan and risk register. Issues and risks that cannot be dealt with at the level of the Mission SEA Task Force will be escalated to the Senior Management Group (SMG).

**Sector-level management structures.** At the sector level, the Head of Office is accountable for addressing SEA in the sector. In 2017-18, each sector will be expected to develop its own region-specific SEA workplan and risk register, aligned with the overarching Mission SEA workplan and risk register. The Head of Office, CDT head of office and sector leadership will use the region-specific SEA workplan and risk register to monitor progress towards results and risks on a monthly or quarterly basis.

**Coordination.** Implementation of this Mission SEA workplan and risk register, will involve close coordination with the wide range of other actors including the PSEA Network, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), National Investigations Officers (NIOs) of TCCs, Member States, UN Headquarters and the Mission’s body used to review the mission risk register.

## 7. Resources

This workplan will be implemented using existing Mission resources. This includes staff time from all Mission components mentioned in the workplan as well as the staff and other resources of CDT offices. As of July 2017, CDT offices are located in duty stations X, Y, Z.

In addition, the workplan will be implemented using extra-budgetary resources for external communications activities on SEA as well as for projects funded by the UN Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.

## 8. Review

This workplan (version 1.0) was approved by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Mission on [date]. Any amendments since are noted below.

Version	Changes made	Author	Date of amendment

### Annexes

Annex A. Logframe for the Sample Mission SEA Workplan 2017-18 (excerpt)

Annex B. Monitoring Plan for the Sample Mission SEA Workplan 2017-18

Annex C. Sample Mission SEA Risk Register 2017-18 (excerpt, see **Tool 3**)

## Annex A. Logframe for the Sample Mission SEA Workplan 2017-18 (excerpt)

**Impact/objective:** To support the effective implementation of the Mission's mandate through a Mission-wide workplan to prevent and address sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of the population by Mission personnel<sup>1</sup>

**Outcome (Prevention): Acts of sexual exploitation and abuse of the population by Mission personnel are prevented**

Output/deliverable	Key activities	Lead (support)	Status (comments)
Output 1: All UN personnel <b>know</b> what are the UN standards of conduct on SEA and their personal and managerial/commander responsibilities to address SEA	1.1. <i>Induction training</i> on SEA for all incoming staff, experts on mission and Military Staff Officers, including roll-out of two new mandatory on-line SEA courses	IMTC (CDT) – civilians MTC (CDT) – experts on mission & Staff Officers	On schedule: All eligible personnel to have completed the mandatory SEA e-learning course by 31 Dec. 17; CDT Officer (P-4) to be recruited for duty station A to work on induction training on SEA (by 31 Dec. 17)
	1.2.... <sup>2</sup>		
Output 2: <b>Monitoring, oversight, accountability and coordination mechanisms</b> on SEA are in place	2.1. Conduct of misconduct/ <b>SEA risk assessment visits</b> to contingent locations focused on SEA prevention	CDT (Brigade/Sector Commanders, HoOs, UNICEF, UNFPA)	Q 1: focus in X, Y, Z areas
	2.2....		
Output 3: <b>Mission-specific policies and procedures</b> on SEA are enforced	3.1. Dissemination and updating of <b>existing mission-specific policies and procedures on SEA</b> (SRSG Memo on SEA, FC Directive on SEA, PC Directive on SEA, Lists of out-of-bounds locations)	OSRSG OFC OPC UNDSS	On schedule; Quarterly updates to lists of out-of-bounds locations
	3.2....		
Output 4: xxx	4.1....		
	4.2....		

<sup>1</sup> Routine activities of the CDT on SEA are not included in this logframe (e.g. producing reports on SEA issues for UNHQ, processing of SEA allegations etc.). These are contained in a separate CDT workplan for 2017-18

<sup>2</sup> This logframe is an excerpt of the sample Mission SEA workplan logframe for 2017-18. The dotted line “....” denotes that data has been deleted.

## Outcome (Enforcement): UN standards of conduct on SEA are enforced when SEA occurs

Output/deliverable	Key activities	Lead (support)	Status (comments)
Output 5: <b>Complaints mechanisms, policies and procedures</b> are in place to enable the population and the Mission personnel to report allegations of SEA in a safe and confidential manner	5.1. Maintenance of <b>complaints mechanisms for the Mission personnel and the population</b> to report SEA, including dedicated telephone, generic email address for complaint reception, Website Intranet/internet; complaint boxes.  5.2....	CDT (Mission IT, Head of Offices, Security Section)	On schedule
Output 6: The Mission <b>receives, assesses, processes and refers</b> in a timely manner all credible SEA allegations to OIOS/TCC (via DFS) for investigation, and when necessary <b>collects and preserves</b> evidence of SEA	6.1. <b>Deployment of a Mission Immediate Response Team (IRT)</b> as required to collect and safeguard evidence in the immediate aftermath of an allegation, including maintaining an up-to-date list of members  6.2....	CDT (UNICEF/UNFPA and relevant Mission entities)	On schedule: Quarterly updating of the list of members
Output 7: The Mission <b>conducts</b> high quality and timely <b>SEA investigations, and supports SEA investigations</b> by others (OIOS, TCCs)	7.1. <b>Conduct of SEA investigations by the Special Investigations Unit (SIU)</b> , for allegations referred back to it by OIOS  7.2....	SIU	On schedule: SEA investigations to be conducted within 3 months of date of referral from OIOS to SIU
Output 8: The Mission <b>recommends administrative, interim and/or disciplinary measures</b> in SEA cases and <b>implements authorised measures</b>	8.1. <b>Request/recommend administrative, interim and/or disciplinary measures</b> in SEA cases for civilian personnel, including administrative leave with or without pay, and implement authorised measures  8.2....	DMS (CDT)	On schedule



**Victim Assistance):** Victims of SEA and children born as a result of SEA by Mission personnel are assisted

Output/deliverable	Key activities	Lead (support)	Status (comments)																		
Output 9: <b>The population know</b> what are the UN standards of conduct on SEA, how to report allegations and what assistance is provided to victims and children born as a result of SEA	9.1. <b>External communications</b> activities on SEA, including development of multimedia content, radio content, CDT outreach activities (media briefing, theatre training and sensitisation on SEA) and production of CDT external communications materials (No Excuse card etc.) (see separate workplan by PAS)	Mission Public Information Department - multimedia content and radio content  CDT - CDT outreach and CDT external comms materials  (UN Department of Public Information)	On schedule: Development of multimedia and ratio content by end December 2017;  3 CBCM projects to be implemented in Q3 and Q4 (Jan.- June 2018)																		
Output 10: All victims and children born as a result of SEA <b>are referred to immediate and longer-term assistance</b> they require	10.1. <b>Strengthening of the UN referral mechanisms</b> for victims of SEA, including ensuring regular meetings of the PSEA Network, an updated membership list, an updated mapping of services for victims, and training of PSEA members on the referral protocols  10.2....	DSRSG/RC/HC (CDT, Mission Victim Rights Advocate)	On schedule: Quarterly updating of the mapping of services for victims of SEA;  Training of PSEA members on referral protocols by 31 December 2017																		
Output 11: The <b>Mission facilitates paternity claims and child support claims</b> made on behalf of children born as a result of SEA by Mission personnel	11.1 <b>Collection of samples for DNA testing</b> in paternity claims involving civilian and uniformed personnel and referral to labs for testing  11.2....	Medical Unit, Mission Support Section (CDT, TCC focal points)	On schedule																		
Output 12: All victims and children born as a result of SEA as well as the general population <b>receive information on the status and outcome of SEA cases</b>	12.1. Establishment of a <b>Victim Rights Advocate</b> in the Mission with a clear ToR  12.2....	<table><tr><th>Status</th><th>Explanation</th></tr><tr><td></td><td>Green = on schedule</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Amber = potential for delays</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Red = no progress/significantly behind schedule</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Blue = completed</td></tr></table>	Status	Explanation		Green = on schedule		Amber = potential for delays		Red = no progress/significantly behind schedule		Blue = completed	<table><tr><td></td><td>Green = on schedule</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Amber = potential for delays</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Red = no progress/significantly behind schedule</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Blue = completed</td></tr></table>		Green = on schedule		Amber = potential for delays		Red = no progress/significantly behind schedule		Blue = completed
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## Annex B. Monitoring Plan for the Sample Mission SEA Workplan 2017-18

No.	Indicator	Baseline (1 July 2017 ) <sup>1</sup>	Target (30 June 2018)	Data source
<b>Outcome (Prevention): Acts of sexual exploitation and abuse of the population by Mission personnel are prevented</b>				
1	Change in the number of SEA allegations reported against all categories of Mission personnel in 2017-18 compared to the previous year (disaggregated by category of personnel and location) [Comment: SEA allegations are counted if they are received between 1 April 2017 and 30 March 2018. The SEA allegation may relate to an incident that took place before 1 July 2017. 1 allegation may involve multiple victims.]	[x] SEA allegations were reported against all categories of Mission personnel in 2016-17 Civilians (x allegations): Location A (x), location B (x)... Military (x allegations): Location C (x), location D (x)... Police (x allegations): Location H (x)... Comment: Data from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017	Reduction in the number of SEA allegation reported against all categories of Mission personnel in 2017-18 compared to 2016-17 (disaggregated by category of personnel and location)	CDT Misconduct Tracking System (MTS)
2	Change in the number of SEA allegations reported against all categories of Mission personnel in 2017-18 compared to the previous year (disaggregated by type of category of personnel and type of SEA act) [Comment: The categorisation of SEA acts is the one used in the Misconduct Tracking System. This indicator is also used to monitor priority risk 1 "Military and police contingent personnel engage in transactional sex with adults", priority risk 3 "Civilians and experts on mission engage in transactional sex with adults" and priority risk 4 "Civilians and experts on mission sexually exploit their domestic workers".]	[x] SEA allegations were reported against all categories of Mission personnel in 2016-17 Civilians (x allegations): rape (x), sexual activity with a minor (x), transactional sex (x), exploitative relationship (x) Military (x allegations): rape (x), transactional sex (x), exploitative relationship (x) Police: x allegations of transactional sex. Comment: Data from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017	Reduction in the number of SEA allegation is reported against all categories of Mission personnel in 2017-18 compared to 2016-17 (disaggregated by type of category of personnel and type of SEA act)	CDT MTS
3	Change in the number of SEA allegations reported against Mission military and police contingent personnel in 2017-18 compared to the previous year (disaggregated by nationality and location) [Comment: The SEA allegation may relate to an incident that took place before 1 July 2017. 1 allegation involves 1 individual. This excludes uniformed personnel with the status of experts on mission such as Military Observers.]	[x] SEA allegations reported against Mission military and police contingent personnel in 2016-17 Nationality A (x allegations): Location C (x), Location D (x)... Nationality B (x allegations): Location E (x)... Nationality C (x allegations): Location F (x)... Nationality D (x allegations): Location H (x) Comment: Data from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017	Reduction in the number of allegation is reported against Mission uniformed personnel in 2017-18 compared to 2016-17 (disaggregated by nationality and location)	CDT MTS

No.	Indicator	Baseline (1 July 2017 )	Target (30 June 2018)	Data source
4	Number of victims of SEA reported in 2017-18 (disaggregated by sex and age <sup>2</sup> ) [Comment: This indicator is also used to monitor priority risk 2 "Mission personnel commit SEA with children".]	Not applicable.  Comment: In 2016-17, [x] victims of SEA were reported in 2016-17 [women (x), men (x) girls (x), boys (x)] Comment: Data from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017	Reduction in the number of victims under 18 years of age.	CDT MTS
<b>Outcome (Enforcement): UN standards of conduct on SEA are enforced when SEA occurs</b>				
5	Number of SEA investigations by the UN or TCCs that have the status of "pending" in 2017-18, more than six months after the allegation was reported to the UN (disaggregated by investigating body)	As of 1 July 2017, [x] SEA investigations have the status of pending in 2017-18 more than six months after the allegation was reported to the UN  [(OIOS (x), SIU (x), TCCs (x), Investigative body to be determined (x))]	No SEA investigations have the status of pending in 2017-18 more than six months after the allegation was reported to the UN (OIOS: 0; TCCs/PCCs: 0, SIU: 0)	CDT MTS
6	Extent to which the Mission CDT considers that SEA investigations conducted by the Mission's SIU in 2017-18 were unable to substantiate an allegation because the evidence was unavailable or difficult to authenticate. [Comment: This is a qualitative indicator to measure priority risk 5 "The evidence in SEA cases is unavailable or difficult to authenticate".]	The Mission CDT considers that the problem of evidence being unavailable or difficult to authenticate was found in [x] out of the [x] SEA investigations conducted by the Mission in 2016-17 and was a significant factor in the SEA allegations being declared as unsubstantiated Comment: Data from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017	Evidence of a decrease in the number of SEA investigations conducted by the Mission's SIU where an allegation could not be substantiated because evidence was unavailable or difficult to authenticate	SIU investigation reports; Meetings with SIU investigators.
<b>Outcome 3 (Victim Assistance): Victims of SEA and children born as a result of SEA by Mission personnel are assisted</b>				
7	Number of victims of SEA reported in 2017-18 who were provided with assistance (disaggregated by sex and age) [Comment: Only victims willing to receive assistance are counted. This indicator is also used to monitor priority risk 10 "Services are not available to victims of SEA and children born as a result of SEA". Used in CDU HQ yearly reporting format.]	Not applicable  Comment: In 2016-17, [x] victims of SEA reported in 2016-17 were provided with assistance [women (x), men (x) girls (x), boys (x)] Comment: Data from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017	All victims of SEA reported in 2017-18 were provided with assistance	CDT MTS

No.	Indicator	Baseline (1 July 2017 )	Target (30 June 2018)	Data source
<b>Outcome 3 (Victim Assistance): Victims of SEA and children born as a result of SEA by Mission personnel are assisted</b>				
8	Number of children born as a result of SEA provided with assistance in 2017-18 (disaggregated by sex) <i>[Comment: Only children willing/whose relatives are willing for them to receive assistance are counted. This indicator is also used to monitor priority risk 10 "Services are not available to victims of SEA and children born as a result of SEA". Used in CDU HQ yearly reporting format.]</i>	Not applicable  Comment: In 2016-17, [x] children born as a result of SEA were provided with assistance [girls (x), boys (x)] <i>Comment: Data from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017</i>	All children born as a result of SEA in 2017-18 were provided with assistance	CDT MTS
9	Change in the number of SEA-related paternity claims against Mission personnel that have the status of "pending" in 2017-18 (disaggregated by category of personnel) <i>[Comment: Paternity claims against Mission personnel that do not involve allegations of SEA are not counted. Data also includes potential paternity claims where the victim is pregnant and the child has not yet been born. Used in CDU HQ yearly reporting format.]</i>	As of 1 July 2017, a total of [x] SEA-related paternity claims against Mission personnel had the status of "pending" [military (x), police (x), civilians (x)]	Reduction in the number of SEA-related paternity claims against Mission personnel as of 1 July 2017 that still have the status of "pending" on 30 June 2018	CDT MTS
10	Change in the number of SEA-related child support claims against Mission personnel that have the status of "pending" in 2017-18 (disaggregated by category of personnel) <i>[Comment: Child support claims against Mission personnel that do not involve allegations of SEA are not counted. Not all paternity claims are accompanied by a child support claim and vice versa.]</i>	As of 1 July 2017, a total of [x] SEA-related child support claims against Mission personnel had the status of "pending" [(military (x), police (x), civilians (x))] <i>Comment: Data from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017</i>	Reduction in the number of SEA-related child support claims against Mission personnel as of 1 July 2017 that still have the status of "pending" on 30 June 2018	CDT MTS

<sup>1</sup> Data on SEA is reported annually by the UN Secretary-General for the timeframe 1 January to end December of each year. In this Mission SEA Workplan, data is tracked annually using the timeframe 1 July to end of June, which corresponds to the Mission's planning and budget cycle.

<sup>2</sup> When disaggregating by age, a distinction is made between adult and child victims; specific ages of victims will not be reported. This applies to all indicators disaggregated by age.

## Tool 3. Sample Mission SEA Risk Register

Risks to Outcome 1 (Prevention)									
Risk ID	Risk and its consequences	Risk factors (causes of the risk)	Likelihood	Impact	Effectiveness of internal controls	Severity residual risk (after internal controls)	Risk response	Action owner	Due date
1	Military and police contingent personnel engage in transactional sex with adults [Priority]	High prevalence of brothels in areas close to UN contingent camps; Cultural attitudes of the population that tolerate or condone transactional sex; Low awareness of specific contingents of UN standards of conduct on SEA on arrival in the mission area; Weak command and control of contingents; Poor UN camp perimeter security and weak entry/exit controls; Poor welfare and recreation provision; Entitlement to rest and recuperation not exercised; Single nation deployments to remote locations; Ability to speak Swahili increases the ability to fraternise with the population when off-duty, in violation of the mission-specific non-fraternisation policy for uniformed personnel.	Imminent (5)	Critical (5)	Limited improvement needed (4)	Very High	(i) Pre-deployment advisory visits to troop- and police-contributing countries to strengthen quality of pre-deployment training on SEA (ii) More frequent SEA risk assessment visits to higher risk locations (iii) More frequent oversight visits by Mission leadership to higher risk locations (iv) Expand community-based complaints mechanisms (CBCMs) and networks of Community Focal Points to cover new high risk locations (v) Increase awareness raising activities by CBCMs (vi) Strengthening liaison between the Mission and local authorities to close down/relocate brothels close to UN military camps	Conduct and Discipline Team (CDT)  CDT  Military component  CDT  CDT  CDT	Quarter (Q1): Visit to [Member State] by end August 2017  Q1: focus in areas X, Y, Z  Q1: focus on all places with presence of military contingent including in duty stations X, Y, Z, ...  Q1: Establishment of CBCM in duty station X by 30 October 2017  Q1: 30 October 2017 in very high risk areas Q1: Focus on airport areas and area Y
2	Mission personnel commit SEA with children [Priority]	[...]	Highly likely (4)	Critical (5)	Limited improvement needed (4)	High	[...]	[...]	[...]
3	Civilians and experts on mission engage in transactional sex with adults [Priority]	[...]	Highly likely (4)	Critical (5)	Limited improvement needed (4)	High	[...]	[...]	[...]
4	Civilians and experts on mission sexually exploit their domestic workers [Priority]	[...]	Likely (3)	Critical (5)	Limited improvement needed (4)	High	[...]	[...]	[...]



Risks to Outcome 2 (Enforcement)									
Risk ID	Risk and its consequence(s)	Risk factors (causes of the risk)	Likelihood	Impact	Effectiveness of internal controls	Severity residual risk (after internal controls)	Risk response	Action owner	Due date
5	<b>The evidence in SEA cases is unavailable or difficult to authenticate</b> , which results in difficulty in substantiating allegations of SEA, which in turn results in impunity for perpetrators, further trauma and harm to victims or witnesses, a perception of a UN cover-up and damage to the Mission's credibility and mandate implementation <b>[Priority]</b>	Physical evidence has been contaminated or destroyed due to delays in the arrival of the TOC/UN investigators; Victims/witnesses disappear and cannot be traced; Victims/witnesses refuse to collaborate with the investigation; Perpetrators give victim a false identity, or victims otherwise do not know the identity of the perpetrator, thereby making identification of the perpetrator difficult/impossible; Victims/witnesses are interviewed multiple times which adds to their trauma and erodes the quality of the evidence; Investigators do not have specialist skills in conducting sexual violence investigations resulted in poor quality of evidence gathered and potentially increased harm to victims and witnesses; Lack of uniform standards for SEA investigations involving UN personnel.	Highly likely (4)	Critical (5)	Limited improvement needed (4)	<b>Very High</b>	(i) Provision of training to the Mission's Special Investigations Unit (SIU) on SEA investigations  (ii) Training for the Mission's Immediate Response Team (IRT) on how to collect and safeguard evidence of SEA in the immediate aftermath of an allegation and pending the arrival on the ground of TOC/UN investigators	CDT (Office of Internal Oversight Services - OIOS)  CDT (OIOS)	Q2 (end Dec. 2017)  By 30 October 2017
6	<b>Mission personnel do not report SEA</b> , which results in the Mission being unable to refer the allegation to investigation, hold Mission personnel to account and assist victims	[...]	Highly likely (4)	Significant (4)	Limited improvement needed (4)	<b>High</b>	[...]	[...]	[...]
7	<b>The population, including victims, do not report allegations of SEA</b> , which results in the Mission being unable to refer the allegation to investigation, hold Mission personnel to account and assist victims	[...]	Highly likely (4)	Significant (4)	Limited improvement needed (4)	<b>High</b>	[...]	[...]	[...]
8	The <b>population make false allegations of SEA</b> , which results in scarce investigations resources being wasted and delays genuine allegations from being investigated	[...]	Likely (3)	Moderate (2)	Limited improvement needed (4)	<b>Moderate</b>	[...]	[...]	[...]
9	The <b>SEA investigation takes a long time to complete</b> , resulting in a perception of impunity for the perpetrator and of a UN cover-up as well as harm to the victim	[...]	Highly likely (4)	High (3)	Limited improvement needed (4)	<b>Moderate</b>	[...]	[...]	[...]

Risks to Outcome 3 (Victim assistance)									
Risk ID	Risk and its consequence(s)	Risk factors (causes of the risk)	Likelihood	Impact	Effectiveness of internal controls	Severity residual risk (after internal controls)	Risk response	Action owner	Due date
10	Services are not available to victims of SEA and children born as a result of SEA, resulting in further trauma and harm to victims and children, delays in victims and children receiving the assistance they need, and loss of trust in CBCMs <b>[Priority]</b>	Lack of health and other services available in many parts of the country; Poor road infrastructure making travel to health and other services difficult; Insecurity hampering access to services; Victims refuse assistance offered by the UN, particularly when they hear that no financial compensation is offered; Local authorities are often unwilling to issue children born as a result of SEA with a birth certificate if the name of the father is unknown, which means that registering children for school and other long-term assistance becomes difficult.	Likely (3)	Significant (4)	Significant improvement needed (3)	High	(i) Train Prevention of SEA Network members on their roles and responsibilities in terms of referral of SEA victims (victim assistance protocols)  (ii) Update the PSEA mapping of services, with other members	CDT (Prevention of SEA Network)  CDT (Prevention of SEA Network)	Q2  Q1: First update of the mapping due on [date]
11	Victims and children born as a result of SEA receive inadequate information on the status of their cases, resulting in further trauma and harm to victims/children, fuelling a perception of impunity of the perpetrator and damaging the image of the Mission	[...]	Likely (3)	High (3)	Limited improvement needed (4)	Moderate	[...]	[...]	[...]

*Comment: This Tool shows an excerpt of the sample Mission SEA risk register for 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018.*

#### Quarters (Q)

Q1 = 1 July 2017 to end September 2017

Q2 = 1 October 2017 to end December 2017

Q3 = 1 January 2018 to end March 2018

Q4 = 1 April 2018 to end June 2018



## Tool 4. Format Mission SEA Risk Register

**[Mission name] SEA Risk Register (start and end date of the financial year)**

[illegible]

## Tool 5. Key Questions for SEA Situation Analysis

This tool contains a list of key questions to guide situation analysis and identify SEA-related risks and risk factors.

### 1. External context

- **Does the country context present opportunities for UN personnel to commit SEA?** (e.g. the existence of a legal and/or open commercial sex industry; high proportion of the population living in poverty or unemployed; cultural tolerance of exchange of money or gifts for sex between consenting adults; cultural practice of early child marriage; a weak rule of law system that is unlikely to be able to hold UN personnel to account for criminal acts)
- **How do the opportunities for UN personnel to commit SEA differ in the capital compared to field locations?** Are there significant regional differences in the context?
- **What opportunities exist for UN personnel to commit SEA in rest and recuperation (R&R) locations?** How easily can acts of SEA be detected in R&R locations?
- **Who in the population is most vulnerable to SEA by UN personnel?** (e.g. domestic workers, teenage school girls, street children, migrant workers in bars and restaurants, populations fleeing conflict who settle around UN bases in search of protection, internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in camps protected by UN peacekeepers)
- **What does trend analysis of past UN data on victims reveal about** who is most vulnerable to SEA by UN personnel?
- **Are UN personnel being approached by the local population and solicited for sex?** (e.g. UN personnel are targeted by commercial sex workers in hotel bars or clubs)
- **How likely are victims and the general population to report SEA allegations?** Could this change as the Mission downsizes or withdraws? (e.g. cultural tolerance of exchange of sex for money or gift between consenting adults may discourage reporting of SEA; socially-conservative attitudes about extra-marital sex may discourage reporting of SEA; countries where homosexuality is illegal would discourage reporting of SEA involving boys/men; there may be fewer reporting channels as the Mission downsizes)
- **What are the likely consequences for children born as a result of SEA by UN personnel?** (e.g. social stigma, difficulty to obtain a birth certificate when paternity is unknown, poor access to education, food and health services)

### 2. UN Field Mission mandate and profile

#### *Mission mandate*

- **Does mandate implementation require extensive contact with populations that are vulnerable to SEA** by UN personnel? Which categories of personnel or components of the Mission are most in contact with such vulnerable populations?

- Does mandate implementation involve **deployments to remote locations where there is limited external oversight of UN personnel?**

### *Mission profile*

- What is the overall composition of the Mission? **Which components have the largest numbers of personnel?**
- Is it a family or **non-family duty station?** How does this affect the organizational culture of the Mission?
- What is the **gender balance** among UN personnel? How does this affect the organizational culture of the Mission?
- Do specific categories of personnel have **a culture of excessive drinking and/or risk taking** (which have been associated factors in some past cases of SEA)?
- **What does trend analysis of past UN data on SEA allegations and cases reveal** about which UN personnel are more likely to commit SEA in the future and under what circumstances? (i.e. data on what has happened in the past can give a good indication of what is likely to happen in the future)
- Where there have been SEA allegations against contingent personnel in the past, **what measures have been taken by those Member States to reduce the likelihood of future incidents?**
- **What does analysis of past SEA investigations reveal** about what challenges are likely to arise in future SEA investigations?
- **Are resources to investigate** allegations of SEA **adequate?**

### 3. UN Field Mission commitment to addressing SEA

- What is the **tone at the top** among Mission leadership about the importance of addressing SEA?
- To what extent do Mission leadership, managers and commanders **lead by example** and demonstrate through their personal behaviour and through their actions in the workplace a commitment to addressing SEA?

### 4. Knowledge and attitudes of UN personnel

- To what extent do UN personnel **know** what are the UN standards of conduct on SEA? (e.g. whether contingents received adequate pre-deployment training on SEA; whether re-hatted troops received training on SEA; whether mandatory SEA training was completed on arrival in the Mission).
- To what extent do UN personnel **accept the UN standards of conduct on SEA?** (e.g. are the standards perceived as an unacceptable intrusion into their private lives)

- To what extent do UN personnel hold attitudes that **tolerate or condone certain forms of SEA?** (e.g. sex with commercial sex workers or early child marriage)

## 5. Access to the local population

### *Location of accommodation/camps*

- Do the **living arrangements of UN personnel and the location of UN camps** present opportunities for UN personnel to commit SEA? (e.g. lax hotel policies on overnight guests, the hiring of domestic workers by civilians, and the close proximity of UN contingent camps to residential areas, schools or market stalls could all present opportunities for SEA)

### *Security situation*

- To what extent does the **security situation affect the ability of UN international personnel and contingent personnel to move around and have contact with the population?** How will this evolve over the coming months?
- Are there lists of **out-of-bounds locations?** Are there adequate resources to patrol these locations? (e.g. by UN military police) How easily can off-duty UN personnel be distinguished from the population?
- Do **Mission-specific policies exist that restrict UN personnel movements and/or off-duty contact** with the population? (e.g. curfews, non-fraternisation policies for uniformed personnel)

### *Camp security and security arrangements*

- To what is extent **can contingent personnel leave their camps undetected?** Is camp security adequate? (e.g. perimeter fencing and lighting, entry/exit controls)
- To what is extent can the **local population enter UN camps, offices and private accommodation undetected?**

## 6. Living and deployment conditions

- Is **welfare provision** for civilian, military and police personnel adequate?
- Are any contingents being **deployed without leave or R&R breaks** for more than twelve months?
- Do specific categories of personnel **stay in the Mission for their R&R breaks** to save money?
- Is it common practice for specific components to **avoid taking annual leave or R&R due to the high tempo of work/operations?**
- Are the **living conditions** for civilian, military and police personnel adequate?

## Tool 6. Examples of SEA Risks and Risk Factors

### Risks to “Objective 1: To prevent SEA by UN personnel”

No.	Examples of risk descriptions	Examples of risk factors
1.	UN civilian, police or military personnel sexually exploit or abuse adult <b>domestic workers in their private accommodation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Vulnerability of domestic workers to SEA due to high levels of poverty and unemployment</li> <li>■ Difficulty to detect SEA taking place in private accommodation of UN personnel creates a sense of impunity</li> <li>■ Low awareness of UN standards of conduct on SEA among domestic workers</li> <li>■ Cultural attitudes of UN personnel that tolerate or condone sexual exploitation of domestic workers</li> </ul>
2.	<b>UN contingent<sup>1</sup> personnel in sector A have transactional sex with adults from the population</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ High prevalence of brothels in areas close to UN contingent camps</li> <li>■ Cultural attitudes of the population that tolerate or condone transactional sex</li> <li>■ Low awareness of contingents of UN standards of conduct on SEA</li> <li>■ Cultural attitudes of UN contingent personnel that tolerate or condone transactional sex</li> <li>■ Weak command and control of contingents</li> <li>■ Weak camp security (e.g. perimeter security and entry/exit controls)</li> <li>■ Contingent personnel in sector A are single-nation units deployed to remote locations</li> <li>■ Poor welfare and recreation provision for contingents</li> <li>■ Poor living conditions in UN contingent camps</li> <li>■ Contingents are deployed without rest and recuperation (R&amp;R) breaks for more than 12 months</li> <li>■ Contingents in sector A speak same language as population, which enables them to communicate easily with the population when off-duty</li> </ul>
3.	<b>UN civilians and military and police personnel with the status of experts on mission have transactional sex with adults from the population</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Cultural attitudes of UN personnel that tolerate or condone transactional sex between consenting adults</li> <li>■ Difficulty to detect SEA taking place in private accommodation of UN personnel creates a sense of impunity</li> <li>■ Excessive drinking and loss of good judgement, linked to high levels of stress</li> <li>■ Soliciting of UN personnel in hotels and bars by members of the population, including commercial sex workers</li> </ul>

<sup>1</sup> UN contingent personnel includes both military contingent personnel and personnel of formed police units

4.	UN civilian, police or military personnel commit <b>SEA with a child</b> <sup>2</sup> (i.e. a person under the age of 18)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Cultural attitudes of UN personnel that tolerate or condone sex with teenagers, including younger teenagers</li> <li>■ Cultural attitudes of UN personnel that tolerate or condone early child marriage</li> <li>■ Cultural attitudes of the population that tolerate or condone exchange of money or gifts for sex</li> <li>■ High numbers of out-of-school children</li> <li>■ High numbers of vulnerable street children around UN offices, UN accommodation or contingent camps</li> </ul>
5.	<b>UN national staff and national contractors</b> commit SEA with the population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Cultural attitudes that tolerate or condone sexual relationships with persons under the age of 18</li> <li>■ Low awareness of UN standards of conduct among national contractor staff (e.g. regarding exchange of sex for employment)</li> <li>■ Weak and corrupt rule of law system that creates a sense of impunity among national staff and contractors</li> </ul>
6.	UN personnel <b>store or share on-line indecent images, video and/or other information of SEA victims</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ UN personnel use private internet providers and personal electronic devices, which makes detection difficult and therefore creates a sense of impunity</li> <li>■ Weak rule of law institutions in host country, which creates a sense of impunity</li> </ul>

## Risks to “Objective 2: To enforce UN standards of conduct on SEA when it occurs”

No.	Examples of risk descriptions	Examples of risk factors
7.	<b>Victims</b> and other members of the population <b>do not report SEA</b> by UN personnel, which results in the UN being unable to investigate the allegation and provide assistance to victims	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Cultural attitudes that condone or tolerate certain forms of SEA such as exchange of gifts or money for sex</li> <li>■ The victim fears physical violence, being socially ostracized or other negative consequences due to social taboos surrounding victims of sexual violence or socially-conservative attitudes about extramarital sex</li> <li>■ The victim fears legal prosecution if he/she reports SEA (e.g. prosecution for adultery or homosexual acts)</li> <li>■ When the victim or his/her relatives are financially dependent on the UN personnel committing SEA, they fear loss of income if they report SEA</li> <li>■ Victims/the population are unwilling to report SEA when they find out that the UN does not provide financial compensation in SEA cases</li> <li>■ Fear of retaliation by perpetrator/others</li> <li>■ Lack of trust in UN complaints mechanisms (e.g. fear that confidentiality will not be maintained, doubts that the UN will take action on the reported allegation)</li> </ul>

<sup>2</sup> A child is defined as “A person under the age of 18, regardless of the age of majority or age of consent locally”. Source: United Nations Glossary on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, 5 October 2016.

8.	<b>UN personnel do not report SEA</b> , which results in the UN being unable to investigate the allegation and provide assistance to victims	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Fear of retaliation by perpetrator/others</li> <li>■ Cultural attitudes that condone or tolerate certain forms of SEA such as transactional sex between consenting adults</li> <li>■ Low awareness of UN standards of conduct on SEA</li> <li>■ Lack of trust in UN complaints mechanisms (e.g. fear that confidentiality will not be maintained )</li> <li>■ Perception that inadequate action will be taken to investigate and sanction perpetrators</li> </ul>
9.	<b>False allegations of SEA are made by the population</b> , which results in investigations resources being wasted and delays genuine allegations being investigated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Individuals make false allegations in the hope of making a financial gain</li> <li>■ Individuals or small businesses in remote areas fear loss of revenue from sale of food and other goods to UN personnel after UN personnel depart, resulting in the population making false allegations to keep UN investigators in the area for longer.</li> </ul>
10.	The <b>evidence in SEA cases is unavailable or difficult to authenticate</b> , which results in difficulty in substantiating allegations of SEA, which in turn results in impunity for perpetrators, further trauma and harm to victims or witnesses, a perception of a UN cover-up and damage to the Mission's credibility and mandate implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Physical evidence has been contaminated or lost due to delays in the arrival of TCC/UN investigators, or due to the passage of time (e.g. for historical allegations of SEA), or due to mishandling, improper storage or collection of evidence etc.</li> <li>■ Victims or witnesses disappear or move away and cannot be traced</li> <li>■ Victims/witnesses refuse to collaborate with the investigation</li> <li>■ Perpetrators give victim a false identity, or victims otherwise do not know the identity of the perpetrator, thereby making identification of the perpetrator difficult/impossible</li> <li>■ Investigators do not have specialist skills in conducting sexual violence investigations resulting in poor quality of evidence gathered and potentially increased harm to victims and witnesses</li> </ul>
11.	<b>Victims and/or witnesses are harmed during the TCC/UN investigation</b> into SEA allegations, which results in further distress and trauma, weakens the quality of the evidence gathered and damages the reputation of the UN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Repeated interviewing of victims or witnesses about the SEA allegation, exacerbating stress and trauma and resulting in poor quality evidence being provided</li> <li>■ Victims or witnesses are intimidated or threatened, and are therefore unwilling to provide evidence</li> <li>■ Investigators do not have specialist skills in conducting sexual violence investigations resulting in the investigation not being conducted in a child- or victim-sensitive manner, which in turn results in further distress and trauma to victims and/or witnesses</li> <li>■ Lack of female investigators resulting in victims or witnesses refusing to provide evidence or feeling intimidated</li> <li>■ National regulations do not permit an in-situ court martial or live-streaming of victim or witness testimony for judicial processes, which results in victims and/or witnesses having to travel to TCCs/PCCS to provide evidence, which may exacerbate their distress and trauma</li> </ul>



12.	<p><b>The TCC/UN SEA investigation takes longer than the prescribed time to complete</b> (i.e. more than six months, or more than three months in expedited investigations)<sup>3</sup>, resulting in further distress and trauma for victims, a perception of impunity for the perpetrator, and a perception of a UN cover-up</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Fear of retaliation by perpetrator/others</li> <li>■ TCCs take more than the 10 days required under the Model Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and TCCs, or the 5 days requested where warranted by the circumstances, to appoint a National Investigations Officer (NIO) from the date that they are notified of the SEA allegation</li> <li>■ The contingent does not include an NIO, which means that an NIO has to be deployed from the TCC home country, resulting in delays in the NIO arriving on the ground.</li> <li>■ Many SEA investigations are conducted jointly by OIOS and TCCs. TCCs are encouraged by the UN Secretary-General to complete the SEA investigation within six months. However, TCCs are not obligated to do so under the Model Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and Troop-contributing Countries.</li> <li>■ Difficulty in tracing witnesses</li> <li>■ Difficulties in mobilizing large numbers of UN investigators at short notice for large-scale SEA investigations</li> <li>■ UN investigators fall ill due to insanitary or harsh living conditions in the field (e.g. malaria)</li> <li>■ Difficulty in accessing remote locations to collect evidence due to logistical barriers and/or insecurity</li> </ul>
13.	<p><b>Public perception that the Mission is taking no or too little action</b> when SEA allegations are reported</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Significant delays in the start or completion of SEA investigations</li> <li>■ The Mission releases too little information on SEA allegations or too late</li> </ul>
14.	<p><b>Public perception that the TCC investigation or joint TCC/UN investigation lacks independence</b> and is biased in favour of the perpetrator</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ TCC investigation is conducted without the participation of the UN</li> <li>■ The TCC/UN releases no or too little information on the SEA investigation while it is on-going</li> </ul>
15.	<p><b>Failure (actual or perceived) by Member States to take action in cases where SEA is substantiated</b>, resulting in a perception of impunity for UN personnel</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Member State does not have extra-territorial jurisdiction for SEA acts that constitute a crime</li> <li>■ Slow administration of justice systems in Member States</li> <li>■ Lack of political will in Member State to take action</li> <li>■ Inadequate reporting by Member States to UN HQ on follow-up action taken in substantiated SEA cases</li> <li>■ Member State imposes a sanction that is not commensurate with sanctions for similar misconduct under national legislation</li> </ul>

<sup>3</sup> The UN Secretary-General has requested that SEA investigations by OIOS or the Mission are to be completed within 6 months of the date of reporting of the allegation to the UN or within 3 months where an expedited timeline is requested by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General has recommended that SEA investigations referred to Member States are to be completed within the same timeframes. SEA investigations referred by OIOS to the Mission to investigate are expected to be completed within 3 months of the date of referral.

## Risks to “Objective 3: To assist victims of SEA and children born as a result of SEA by UN personnel”

No.	Examples of risk descriptions	Examples of risk factors
16.	<b>There are no medical or other services</b> in the vicinity of where victims live, <b>or these services are of poor quality</b> , resulting in victims receiving no or inadequate immediate assistance, or delayed assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Scarce health and psycho-social service provision by the host government and others in remote areas</li> <li>■ Poor quality health and other service provision by the host government and others in remote areas</li> <li>■ Insecurity constrains travel by victims to nearby health or other facilities</li> <li>■ Poor road infrastructure makes travel by victims to nearby health or other facilities difficult (e.g. during rainy season)</li> </ul>
17.	<b>The paternity of children born as a result of SEA by UN personnel is not recognized</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ UN personnel refuse to provide DNA evidence for a paternity test</li> <li>■ Relatives of children born as a result of SEA don't know how to navigate the court system in the TCC/PCC in order to achieve recognition of paternity</li> </ul>
18.	<b>Children born as a result of SEA by UN personnel do not receive child support from their fathers</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Relatives of children born as a result of SEA don't know how to navigate the court system in the country of nationality of the father of the child in order to have a court order for child support implemented</li> <li>■ Relatives of children born as a result of SEA face obstacles in navigating their own national court system to secure a court order for child support</li> <li>■ Ineffective judicial system in the host country results in delays in securing a court order for child support</li> </ul>
19.	<b>Victims receive no information or inadequate information from Member States on action taken in substantiated SEA cases</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Member States provide no information or inadequate information on action taken in substantiated cases</li> <li>■ Lack of dedicated focal point in the Mission to liaise with victims</li> </ul>

## Tool 7. Scoring Tables to Assess SEA Risks

When scoring the likelihood of a risk occurring, users are answering the question: “How likely is it that the risk will happen in the future?”. In so doing, they need to consider:

- How certain is it that the risk will occur?
- How frequently is this risk likely to occur?

When deciding on a score, users should make a judgement, based on their understanding of the context and risk factors. If available, users should also examine any statistics on SEA for the UN Field Mission (e.g. past data on SEA allegations, cases, investigations and victims), since data on what has happened in the past can give a good indication of what is likely to happen in the future.

**Table 1. Scoring criteria to measure the likelihood of occurrence of SEA-related risks**

SCORE	RATING	CERTAINTY	FREQUENCY
5	Imminent	More than 90 percent	Could occur very frequently; or could occur at least once every three months (i.e. at least once per quarter) based on past data
4	Highly likely	Less than 90 percent	Could occur frequently; or could occur at least once every six months based on past data
3	Likely	Less than 60 percent	Could be recurrent but not frequent; or could occur at least once every twelve months based on past data
2	Unlikely	Less than 30 percent	Could occur but not common; or could occur at least every 1-2 years based on past data
1	Rare	Less than 10 percent	Would almost never occur; or could occur at least every 2 years or more based on past data

These tables are based on “Annex 2. Scoring criteria for the measurement of Impact, Likelihood and Level of Internal Control Effectiveness” in the UN Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and Internal Controls Guide (2016)

When scoring the impact of a risk on an objective, users are answering the question: “If the risk happens, how severe will its impact be on the objective<sup>1</sup> in the Mission’s SEA workplan?”. In other words, users need to ask themselves:

- What impact will the risk have on the reputation of the Mission?
- What operational impact will the risk have on the Mission? In other words, what impact will it have on the achievement of the objective<sup>2</sup> in the Mission’s SEA workplan, and will the risk have a broader impact on other mandated objectives?
- What impact will the risk have on the safety and security of UN personnel, of the population (including victims of SEA and children born as a result of SEA) and of UN partner organizations? What impact will the risk have on the safety and security of UN infrastructure, equipment and other assets?
- What impact will the risk have on the resources available to the Mission to implement its mandate?

Users should make their own judgement as to the relative weighting given to each of the four criteria, as this will be context specific. Again, if available, users should also examine any past data available on the impact of risks (e.g. on the reputational impact of the risk of investigations taking too long to complete), since data on what has happened in the past can give a good indication of future impact.

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<sup>1</sup> In **Tool 2. Sample Mission SEA Workplan**, the Mission’s three objectives on SEA are the same as the workplan’s “outcomes”.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

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These tables are based on “Annex 2. Scoring criteria for the measurement of Impact, Likelihood and Level of Internal Control Effectiveness” in the UN Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and Internal Controls Guide (2016)

**Table 2. Scoring criteria to measure the impact of SEA-related risks**

DESCRIPTION OF IMPACT					
SCORE	RATING	REPUTATIONAL	OPERATIONAL	SAFETY AND SECURITY	FINANCIAL
5	Critical	Reports in key international and national media/forum for more than one week	The objective <sup>3</sup> in the Mission's SEA workplan can no longer be achieved; or Mandate implementation is severely affected.	Loss of life of UN personnel; or Loss of life of members of the population, including victims, witnesses and children born as a result of SEA; or Loss of life of personnel of UN partner organizations <sup>4</sup>	The risk cannot be addressed using existing resources of the Mission and additional resources need to be obtained (e.g. from Member States, UN Headquarters).
4	Significant	Comments in international media/forum	Significant, on-going interruption to implementation of the objective <sup>5</sup> in the Mission's SEA workplan; or Significant, on-going interruptions to mandate implementation.	Physical injury and/or non-physical threats and harm to UN personnel <sup>6</sup> ; or  Physical injury and/or non-physical threats and harm to members of the population, including victims, witnesses and children born as a result of SEA <sup>7</sup> ; or  Physical injury and/or non-physical threats and harm to UN partner organizations.  Note: If there is a risk of physical injury and/or non-physical threat, <u>the risk will always be considered as 4 (significant)</u> not 3 (high).	Addressing the risk requires significant re-allocation of Mission resources; resources need to be diverted away from mandate implementation to address this risk.
3	High	Several external comments within the host country	Moderate interruptions to implementation of the objective <sup>8</sup> in the Mission's SEA workplan; or Moderate interruptions to mandate implementation.	Physical injury and/or non-physical threats and harm to UN partner organizations.  Note: If there is a risk of physical injury and/or non-physical threat, <u>the risk will always be considered as 4 (significant)</u> not 3 (high).	Addressing the risk requires moderate re-allocation of Mission resources. No resources are diverted away from mandate implementation to address this risk.
2	Moderate	Isolated external comments within the host country	Limited interruptions to implementation of the objective <sup>9</sup> in the Mission's SEA workplan; or Limited interruptions to mandate implementation.	Loss of, or damage to, or misuse of UN infrastructure, equipment and other assets (e.g. offices, computers, phones, vehicles)	Addressing the risk requires limited re-allocation of Mission resources. No resources are diverted away from mandate implementation to address this risk.
1	Low/none	Insignificant or none	Insignificant or none	Insignificant or none	Addressing the risk can be done using existing staffing and resources. Mission resources do not have to be re-allocated to address this risk.

These tables are based on "Annex 2. Scoring criteria for the measurement of Impact, Likelihood and Level of Internal Control Effectiveness" in the UN Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and Internal Controls Guide (2016)

When scoring the effectiveness of internal controls, users are answering the question: “How effective are the Mission’s internal controls at reducing the likelihood and/or impact of this risk?”.

In deciding how to score, users should use subjective judgement as well as any data from formal SEA risk assessment visits to contingent camps and other locations that examine the adequacy of internal controls.

**Table 3. Scoring criteria to measure the effectiveness of internal controls on SEA**

SCORE	RATING	DESCRIPTION
5	Effective	Controls are properly designed and operating as intended. Management activities are effective in managing and mitigating risks
4	Limited improvement needed	Controls and/or management activities are properly designed and operating somewhat effectively, with some opportunities for improvement identified.
3	Significant improvement needed	Key controls and/or management activities in place, with significant opportunities for improvement identified
2	Ineffective	Limited controls and/or management activities are in place, high level of risk remains. Controls and/or management activities are designed and are somewhat ineffective in efficiently mitigating risk or driving efficiency.
1	Highly ineffective	Controls and/or management activities are non-existent or have major deficiencies and do not operate as intended. Controls and/or management activities as designed are highly ineffective in efficiently mitigating risk.

<sup>3</sup> In **Tool 2. Sample Mission SEA Workplan**, the Mission’s three objectives on SEA are the same as the workplan’s “outcomes”.

<sup>4</sup> For example, organizations sub-contracted to implement programmes of the UN Field Mission such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3.

<sup>6</sup> Examples of physical injury to UN personnel could include physical attacks by relatives of the victim or by violent demonstrators. Examples of non-physical threats to UN personnel include blackmail, intimidation, harassment and threats of violence.

<sup>7</sup> Examples of physical injury to victims could include bruising and injury, problems with the reproductive system, sexual dysfunction, contracting HIV or other sexually transmitted infections as well as unwanted pregnancy. Examples of non-physical threats and harm to victims, witnesses and children born as a result of SEA include intimidation, harassment, threats of violence, emotional and psychological harm, social ostracism, removal of financial support from relatives, exclusion from school, and arrest (e.g. for sex outside of marriage).

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 3.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid

These tables are based on “Annex 2. Scoring criteria for the measurement of Impact, Likelihood and Level of Internal Control Effectiveness” in the UN Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and Internal Controls Guide (2016)

When scoring the severity of the residual risk, users are answering the question: “How severe is the risk, after the effectiveness of existing internal controls has been taken into account?”.

**Table 4. Criteria to measure the severity of residual risk**

SCORING	RATING	DESCRIPTION
<b>Red</b>	Very High	<p>Very high risks are perceived to be of greatest importance and require the most attention from Mission leadership, managers and commanders.</p> <p>Treatment action is likely to continuously involve Mission leadership. Treatment action may also involve UN Headquarters and Member States.</p>
<b>Amber</b>	High	<p>High risks require dedicated focus and specific remedial action.</p> <p>Treatment action is likely to regularly involve Mission leadership and continuously involve Mission managers and commanders.</p>
<b>Yellow</b>	Moderate	<p>Moderate risks require specific remedial measures or monitoring measures.</p> <p>Treatment action is likely to involve specific actions by Mission managers and commanders, or monitoring of risks.</p>
<b>Green</b>	Low	<p>Low risks require periodic monitoring to provide assurance that the level of risk is not increasing.</p>

These tables are based on “Annex 2. Scoring criteria for the measurement of Impact, Likelihood and Level of Internal Control Effectiveness” in the UN Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and Internal Controls Guide (2016)



## Tool 8. 25 Examples of SEA Internal Controls

### Examples of internal controls to address the risk of UN personnel committing SEA

#### *Awareness-raising and training*

1. Measures to **increase knowledge of UN personnel on UN standards of conduct on SEA and how to report SEA** (e.g. through induction and refresher training; internal communications activities via townhalls, the Mission intranet etc.; requirement for experts on mission and contingent commanders to sign a confirmation letter acknowledging that they understand the UN standards of conduct and will fulfill their responsibilities in this regard).
2. Measures to create an **organizational culture** that is respectful of both women and men (e.g. provision of gender awareness training, messaging from Mission leadership, regular dialogue between mission headquarters and female staff deployed to remote locations with poor gender balance).
3. **Public events to acknowledge or reward good conduct and discipline** while on deployment (e.g. ceremonies, certificates or medals to reward contingent members and contingent commanders).

#### *Human resources*

4. Measures to **improve gender balance** among civilian and uniformed personnel at all levels, including deployment of all-female contingents.

#### *Accountability, structures and policies*

5. A clear **tone at the top** underlining the importance of addressing SEA and the importance of UN core values (e.g. issuance of a Head of Mission vision statement on SEA; inclusion of SEA as an agenda topic in management meetings and commander conferences).
6. Dedicated **structures and resources to address SEA** (e.g. conduct and discipline experts or focal points, Standing SEA Task Force, networks of SEA focal points, Immediate Response Teams (IRT) to collect and safeguard SEA evidence in the immediate aftermath of an SEA allegations being received).
7. Inclusion of language on addressing SEA in senior leadership **Compacts and in the performance appraisals** of managers and commanders and other staff.
8. **Mission-specific policies and procedures that restrict UN personnel movements and off-duty contact with the local population** (e.g. curfews, lists of out-of-bounds areas where prostitution is known or suspected to occur, non-fraternisation policy for uniformed personnel, policy on wearing of uniform at all times within the Mission area (except when on leave), requirement for contingents to move in supervised groups when off-duty, ban on use of domestic workers from the population in UN contingent camps; policy prohibiting certain categories of contractor personnel (e.g. cleaners) being in UN compounds after working hours or at weekends).

9. Measures to **restrict access of the population to UN accommodation/camps of civilian and uniformed personnel** (e.g. restrict the timings when cleaners can be in UN camps to minimize contact with UN staff, liaise with the local authorities to prevent new businesses/dwellings from being erected adjacent to UN contingent camps).
10. **Monitoring and oversight of high risk locations for SEA** (e.g. SEA risk assessment visits, deployment of conduct and discipline experts to high risk areas, regular visits by senior military commanders to high risk locations).

### *Safety and security*

11. Strengthening **perimeter security of UN military camps** to prevent unauthorized absences of contingent members and unauthorized persons from entering camps.
12. Strengthening **entry/exit controls into UN camps/offices/accommodation blocks**.

### *Welfare and living conditions*

13. Provision of **adequate welfare facilities** (e.g. internet, phone/skype, gym, outdoor sports, indoor games, supervised outings, UN welfare flights, inter-contingent sporting competitions, provision of PX facilities, food deliveries to remote locations) and **adequate living conditions** for civilian, military and police personnel.
14. **Provision of counselling services** for civilian, military and police personnel.
15. **Design of contingent camps and UN premises to minimize off-duty contact with the population** (e.g. by including space to play outdoor games/sports inside the camp/premises; by locating contingent camps away from existing residential areas and markets).
16. **Channeling personal, charitable donations from UN personnel** (e.g. food and non-food items) **through third party organisations** such as non-governmental (NGOs).

### Examples of internal controls to address risks relating to enforcement of UN standards of conduct on SEA when it occurs

17. Establishment of **complaints mechanisms** for UN personnel and for the population to increase reporting of SEA (e.g. toll-free telephone hotline, complaint boxes in offices and outside contingent camps, community-based complaint mechanisms).
18. **Patrolling** curfews and out-of-bounds locations (e.g. using UN Military Police).
19. Use of **Immediate Response Teams (IRT)** to collect and safeguard SEA evidence.
20. **External communications** on the status and outcome of SEA investigations.

## Examples of internal controls to address risks relating to assisting victims of SEA and children born as a result of SEA by UN personnel

### *Awareness-raising and communications*

21. **External communications activities** targeting the population on risk factors for SEA, UN standards of conduct on SEA, reporting mechanisms for the population, and assistance available to victims and children born as a result of SEA. This should be done in coordination with other mission components, local authorities and civil society (e.g. traditional leaders, youth and women groups). Examples of communications activities include: radio programmes, community theatre and dance, distribution of t-shirts/umbrellas/hats with SEA messaging, pocket cards in local languages on how to report SEA).

### *Immediate and longer-term assistance*

22. **Establishment of referral mechanisms for victims of SEA** so that victims are provided with immediate support (e.g. psycho-social assistance, shelter, security/protection) and longer-term support (e.g. skills training, support to return to full-time education).
23. Measures to **facilitate paternity claims and child support claims** for children born as a result of SEA by UN personnel (e.g. provision of free DNA testing by the Mission to establish paternity, follow-up with troop- and police-contributing countries through UN Headquarters).
24. Establishment of **victim rights advocates in Missions** to maintain contact with victims and assist them to gain access to judicial redress and get feedback on the status of their cases.

### *Follow-up with Member States*

25. **Follow up with Member States**, via UN Headquarters, **on the status and outcome of SEA cases and paternity and child support claims.**

## Tool 9. Sample Format for a Misconduct/SEA Risk Assessment Visit

### Contingents

#### 1. Basic Data:

(a) Unit Visited:

(b) Unit Commander:

(c) Date and Duration of Visit:

(d) Date of last Inspection visit:

Inspection Team Members:

- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 

#### 2. Assessment Data:

(a) Unit Strength:

Male

Female

(b) Officers:

(c) Other Ranks:

Total:

#### 3. Details of Unit Rotation:

(a) Date of Arrival in Mission Area:

(b) Expected Date of Rotation out:

#### 4. Details of SEA FP:

(a) Name & Rank of SEA FP:

(b) Has/have SEA FP been trained by CDT?

(c) Has/have SEA FP trained the contingent unit's personnel? If so, when?

**5. Prevention of misconduct, including SEA:**

Has the UNIT:

- i. Received pre-deployment training on conduct and discipline for military or police personnel?

If yes, when? Where? \_\_\_\_\_

☐ YES

☐ NO

Did the pre-deployment training include SEA awareness?

☐ YES

☐ NO

- ii. Instructed its personnel on the cultural background of the local inhabitants?

☐ YES

☐ NO

- iii. Conducted internal training for its personnel on Conduct & Discipline (by the trainers trained during ToT)?

☐ YES

☐ NO

- iv. Been informed that purchasing, keeping, transporting, selling or exporting wild animals or parts thereof is strictly prohibited by the United Nations?

☐ YES

☐ NO

- v. Been informed that purchasing, keeping, transporting, selling or exporting raw minerals is strictly prohibited by the United Nations?

☐ YES

☐ NO

- vi. Issued its personnel with:

(a) Pocket card "Ten Rules – Code of Personal Conduct for UN Peacekeepers"

(b) Pocket card "We are United Nations Peacekeepers"

☐ YES

☐ NO

- vii. Is the Mission Code of Conduct displayed in visible places within the Unit premises?

If yes, where?

☐ YES

☐ NO

**6. General Awareness:**

- (a) Does Personnel know the Contingent Curfew Hours:
- (b) Does Personnel know the Out-of-Bounds Areas:
- (c) Is Personnel aware of Requirement to move outside Camp in Uniform:
- (d) Is Personnel aware of the Non-Fraternization Policy:

**7. Welfare:**

- i. Does the Unit have a designated Welfare Officer? YES NO

If so, who?

- ii. Does the Unit have recreational facilities and arrangements (sports/games facilities, TV and music systems, reading materials etc.)? YES NO

If yes, which facilities?

- iii. Does the Unit provide internet and telephone connections to all its elements? YES NO

**8. Reporting of Misconduct:**

- i. Does the Unit possess a hardcopy of the United Nations “Standard Operating Procedures on Implementation of Amendments on Conduct and Discipline in the Model Memorandum of Understanding [DPKO/DFSRef. 2011.01]”? YES NO

- ii. Does the Unit possess a hardcopy of the latest version of the Mission Force Commander’s Conduct & Discipline/SEA Prevention Directive, and the mission Code of conduct? YES NO

- iii. How does the unit address allegations of misconduct raised by either fellow Mission personnel or the host population?

**9. Assessment of Camp:**

(a) Number of entry  and exit  points to/from the camp

(b) Does the Unit have a movement log registering traffic into/out of the camp?

 YES

 NO

(c) Lighting

 good

 bad

 acceptable

If less than good, where should it be improved?

(d) Security fences

 good

 bad

 acceptable

If less than good, where should it be improved?

(e) Is there any local market/local persons selling goods near the camp?

 YES

 NO

If yes, what has the Unit done to address the matter?

(f) Is there any prostitution venue near the camp?

 YES

 NO

If yes, what has done the Unit to address the matter?

(g) Does the Unit have its own Military Police conducting day/night patrols within the camp?

 YES

 NO

(h) Other observation/information (confirmed or not confirmed)



**10. Recommendations:****11. Measures to be taken and expected time for implementation:****Next date of visit by Inspection Team:**

# Quarterly SEA Risk Assessment Tracking Tool

**Mission:** [Name]  
**Year:** [e.g. 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018]  
**Period covered:** [e.g. 1 July 2017-30 September 2017 (Quarter 1)]  
**Region/sector:**

No.	Location	Name of contingent/ UN office	Date of visit	Assessment team	Risks and their consequence(s)	Risk factors (causes of the risk)	Effectiveness internal controls	Severity residual risk (after internal controls)	Risk response	Action owner	Due date	Status (comments)										
1	Smalltown	RURBATT	01/07/2017	Jane Jones; François Honoré; LtCol. Mohammed	(i) Contingent personnel commit transactional sex with adults or children	(i) New brothels have opened up near RURBATT camp; (ii) Weak entry/exit controls; (iii) Poor welfare facilities	Limited improvement needed (4)	High	(i) Improve entry/exit controls; (ii) Improve welfare facilities	Unit commander RURBATT	(i) 1 Aug. 2017; (ii) End Sept. 2017	Unit commander agreed to all recommendations										
2	Smalltown	NANBATT	05/07/2017	Sergei Rostov; Patience Otieno; LtCol. Mohammed	(i) Contingent personnel have underage girlfriends; (ii) Contingent personnel commit transactional sex with adults or children	(i) Low awareness of Mission-specific policies and procedures on SEA; (ii) Cultural tolerance for transactional sex; (iii) Contingent can speak the local language and communicate easily with the population; (iv) Poor welfare facilities	Significant improvement needed (3)	Very High	(i) Improve training on SEA; (ii) Improve welfare provision; (iii) Increase frequency of visits by senior military leadership	(i) Military Training Cell; (ii) Unit commander NANBATT; (iii) Office Force Commander	(i) Train the trainers due 15 July 2017; (ii) Improve by 15 August 2017; (iii) Move from quarterly to monthly visits	On Schedule										
<table><tr><th>Status</th><th>Explanation</th></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>1 or green = on schedule</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>2 or orange = potential for delays</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>3 or red = no progress/significantly behind schedule</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>4 or blue = completed</td></tr></table>													Status	Explanation	1	1 or green = on schedule	2	2 or orange = potential for delays	3	3 or red = no progress/significantly behind schedule	4	4 or blue = completed
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**United Nations Peace Operations**